Political philosophy of Walter Lippmann by McIntyre, Dan
University of Montana 
ScholarWorks at University of Montana 
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & 
Professional Papers Graduate School 
1983 
Political philosophy of Walter Lippmann 
Dan McIntyre 
The University of Montana 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
McIntyre, Dan, "Political philosophy of Walter Lippmann" (1983). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, 
& Professional Papers. 5056. 
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/5056 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of 
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an 
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
COPYRIGHT ACT OF.1976
T h i s  i s  a n  u n p u b l i s h e d  m a n u s c r i p t  i n  w h i c h  c o p y r i g h t  s u b ­
s i s t s . An y  f u r t h e r  r e p r i n t i n g  o f  i t s  c o n t e n t s  m u s t  b e  a p p r o v e d
BY THE AUTHOR.
Ma n s f i e l d  L i b r a r y  
Un i v e r s i t y  of s I 
Da t e  : ___
'THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
OF WALTER LIPPMANN
by
Dan McIntyre 
B.A., University of Montana, 1974
Presented in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Interdisciplinary Studies
UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA
1983
Approved by:
Chairman, Board of Examiners
hool
Date
UMI Number: EP40520
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion. '
UMI EP40520
Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
UMI
DSssertatiem PuMishfeg
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106 -1346
McIntyre, Dan, M .I;S.December 1983 Interdisciplinary Studies
(Political Econany)
The Political Philosophy of Walter Lippmann (96 pp.)
Director: Ron Perrin, Professor of Political Theory
The major tensions in the political philosophy of Walter 
Lippmann are not difficulties unique to him. Instead, Lippmann's 
work reflects deep-seated tensions within the American tradition. 
These tensions are: (1) Standards cannot be set solely by reference 
to either the material or the ideal realm. Instead, the two 
realms must be continually related and an always changing 
equilibrium struck between than. (2) Modernity (which could be 
summarized as liberalism, capitalism and the scientific outlook) 
is a double-edged sword: It provides and protects, yet it also
corrodes and alienates. Modernity makes a nation wealthy and 
powerful, but corrupts its citizenry with expediency, opportunism 
and drift. The modem citizen typically adopts a non-teleological 
view of the universe, yet retains a teleological view of human 
existence. (3) There is no settled view of human nature, of the 
needs and desires of humanity. Human nature is at one point 
regarded as innately opposed to civil order, while at another.it 
is the very foundation of the highest Values of civility. The 
acquisitive, self-interested and domineering individual is 
lauded in one setting but condemned in another.
lippmann's work guides political thinkers to these issues, 
issues that remain unresolved today. Lippmann's attempt: to 
resolve these matters was not satisfactory, primarily because . 
he approached these problems with a foregone preference for the 
existing order. He preferred hierarchy and stability to equality 
and change. Standing against idealists and radicals, he assigned 
primacy to the past, rather than the future. He searched not for 
meaning or purpose; instead, he sought authority. He saw the 
unresolved tensions of American political philosophy not as 
questions in need of answers but as the burning call for the 
establishment of an authority that could resolve disruptions 
caused by these tensions. He searched for an authority that would 
be vested in the hands of an elite which was dedicated to the 
gentle treatment of the status quo.
For Judy Ann McIntyre
The glance of an ideal love is terrible and glorious, 
foreboding death and immortality together.
-*-■ George Santayana
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INTRODUCTION
Walter Lippmann was neither.a political theorist nor a 
philosopher, according to his preeminent biographer, Ronald 
Steel. Of Lippmann's most famous works of political philosophy, 
Steel has this to say: The Good Society is plagued by 
"confusion;"1 Essays in the Public Philosophy never overcomes "a 
disturbing vagueness."2 "Lippmann's great talent lay in analysis 
and explanation, not in theorizing," states Steel.3 Again, 
referring to The Public Philosophy, which many of Lippmann's 
readers had hoped would be his definitive work, Steel concludes: 
"He could analyze situations with finesse and give off brilliant 
flashes of illumination. Yet when he tried to use these powers to 
mold a coherent philosophy, he stumbled...."4 Lippmann, states 
Steel, "did not form patterns like a philosopher."^
This thesis supports Steel's contention that Lippmann's work 
was contradictory. Section I shows that Lippmann, on the one 
hand, condemned Marxist determinism as "fatalistic," yet, on the 
other, espoused the "inexorable historic necessity" of his own 
theory of economic determinism. Section II shows that Lippmann 
argued both that natural law provides normative principles and 
that natural law is simply the sum of those principles necessary 
for order and convenience. Section II also documents Lippmann's 
transition from one who believed there are no eternal principles 
to one who argued for the existence of objectively knowable moral
-2-
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truths. Section III finds yet another twist to Lippmann's 
thought. It shows that in Public Opinion Lippmann argues that it 
is impossible, in principle, for humans to know the world as it 
really is. Instead of knowing objective reality, people create 
and act upon a continually revised, counterfeit reality.
Yet, despite these major difficulties (and this thesis 
exposes several others), Lippmann is nonetheless ranked among the 
prominent American political philosophers. Clinton Rossiter and 
James Lare, for instance, hold that Lippmann was "first of all a 
political thinker," "a person of immense influence in clarifying 
.the values and shaping the policies of two generations of 
Americans." Are Rossiter and Lare simply wrong when they describe 
Lippmann as a thinker "who speaks not only to the living but also 
to generations unborn" on the "ethical and social problems that 
have been with us in the West from the beginning and will be with 
us to the end...."?6
This thesis proposes that one can accept the philosophical 
shortcomings of Walter Lippmann and still find him a political 
philosopher. This is true because the problems in the political 
philosophy of Walter Lippmann reflect problems in American 
political thought.
The politics of Lippmann, like the politics of much of 
America, is conservative in its view of human nature, yet liberal 
in its faith in human institutions; it is absolutist in its faith 
in the rule of law, yet materialist and relativist in its view of 
history and society.
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In Lippmann's ideas, as in America's, the essential parts do 
not always fit. Lippmann, for instance, had a love-hate 
relationship with modernity. He did not deny its potency and 
munificence as the provider for humanity. The scientific method 
and the divisin of labor brought wealth and power, he argued, 
strengthening a nation against its external enemies. Yet,
Lippmann also warned that modernity made a nation's citizens 
vulnerable to attack from within: Where there should be citizens 
with shared values and goals, there are ethical weaklings or 
self-righteous bullies, and there is a pervasive anomie. Where 
there should be leadership, there is expediency, opportunism and 
drift.
Lippmann would have suffered modernity's eclipse of the 
values of the past, had modernity produced satisfactory values of 
its own. But he was convinced that it did not, and that left him 
nowhere to turn. When one distrusts the future, as Lippmann did, 
and lives among people who disavow their past, as Americans do, 
there is no refuge from the present, there is no source 
of strength other than the present.
If Lippmann had believed modernity could bring into being a 
new humanity, if he had not concluded that human nature is 
innately opposed to civil order, then perhaps he would have found 
a redemptive future anticipated in the present. If Lippmann had 
found a clear set of shared ideals among the American people, 
then perhaps he could have made his argument for civility in 
secular and human terms, instead of resorting to divinity.
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Lippmann had difficulties perceiving shared ideals among the 
American people because his own ideals were so problematic. 
Lippmann aimed to avoid dogmatism -- and to a certain extent, 
idealism —  because he believed it would cut him off from the 
changing environment. Steel's biography of Lippmann is indeed the 
chronicle of a realist who tried to adjust his ideals to the 
qualitative and quantitative changes of "the American century."
To Lippmann, preserving the capacity to adjust to changing 
circumstances is the key to being a "progressive."
Yet, no matter how frequently he adjusted his views of 
social reality, no matter how willing he was "to jettison old 
ideas as soon as new ones were at hand,"^ Lippmann succumbed to 
the pressure to freeze some basic parts of his world view. This 
resulted in the conservative determinism examined in Section I. 
His open-ended pragmatism solidified, despite his avowed 
intentions.
Those supporters of Lippmann who see no philosophical 
inadequacies in his work have subconsciously closed one eye to 
problems like these. Where Lippmann saw necessity, universality 
and morality, they see the same. They do not question the fit 
between his historicism and his absolutism, between his 
pragmatism and his natural law. They accept his a priori 
understandings. Like him, they have reified, certain aspects of 
the existing order.
Those critics who dwelled on the philosophical shortcomings 
and inconsistencies in Lippmann's work were, from his
-5-
perspective, missing the point. He regarded the intricacies of 
intellectual work as far removed from the realities of politics: 
"For what operates in history is not the systematic idea as 
genius framed it, but shifting imitations, replicas, 
counterfeits, analogies, and distortions in individual minds."®
Lippmann is partially correct in this assessment of the 
American public —  it does judge ideas by their consequences, not 
by their theoretical niceties. However, as Lippmann learned later 
in his life, that sort of pragmatic attitude should not be 
blindly encouraged: To do so is most likely to result in a 
complete denial of the ideal, to do so is to further cynicism and 
decay.
To a large extent, the philosophical lapses, the turn-abouts 
and the internal inconsistencies of Lippmann'S work can be . 
attributed to his pragmatic desire for a tight fit between the 
ideal and the real. As shown in Sections I and III, Lippmann 
tended to achieve this fit by bending the ideal to the real, not 
vice versa. In Public Opinion, in particular, he flatly denied 
the significance and the constancy of the ideal. As Sections I 
and III show, Lippmann believed the real, not the ideal, is what 
endures —  endures not in its specific embodiments, but endures 
as a massive causal force, as an entity which overwhelmingly 
outweighs the ideal.
On the balance, however, Lippmann —  like America —  never 
entirely abandons the ideal. Steel is correct when he states:
-6-
He was a skeptic who yearned for an 
overvaulting sense of order he feared did 
not exist.... He was a realist who never 
quite suppressed his youthful romanticism 
and idealism —  qualities that saved him
from negativism and cynicism in his oldage. ̂
The same could be said of America's wellspring of idealism: It is
not even close to running dry. Those leaders with the most
powerful followings always draw heavily upon it. If the body 
politic is to be moved, both its idealistic and its realistic 
sides must be touched. There are, of course, those who cynically 
manipulate the idealistic side of the American character, 
justifying self-serving police actions in the Caribbean and 
Central America, for example, with statements about preserving 
the abstract freedom of America's neighbors. As such rhetoric 
indicates, the content of America' ideals remains totally 
unsettled.
This is where the work of political philosophers (and 
historians and humanists in general) becomes crucially 
important. In this respect, Lippmann's work is disturbing: He 
operates under a foreshortened understanding of the ideal, and he 
is all too willing to abandon even this truncated view of the 
ideal. Lippmann remained idealistic, for example, not about human 
nature, but about humanity's ability to repress and contain human 
nature. As is discussed in Section II, he grew increasingly 
pessimistic about the gut stuff of humanity, referring to "our 
natural and uncivilized selves,"10 and to "the primitive and 
persistent impulse to dominate, to submit, to stand in awe of
power and to seek its protection."-*--*- As is shown in Section III, 
his doctrine of natural law is founded not on the natural 
impulses of humanity, but on what he saw as the need to civilize 
those impulses. From this outlook it is merely a short step to 
Lippmann's egoistic, elitist social view. He prescribed 
heavyhanded institutions to keep the uncivilized multitudes in 
check. Since he regarded the natural individual as aggressive, 
selfish and immature, he saw the masses as a destructive force 
that must be contained, not as a redemptive force to be 
liberated. The exceptional few, the moral and intellectual elite, 
would be the caretakers of the relatively static institutional 
restraints placed upon the masses.
This conservative view of human nature is not, obviously, 
the only outlook found in American political theory. There are 
those, and the younger and more liberal Lippmann was among them, 
who regard humanity's natural desires as potentially positive 
forces. Young Lippmann believed that the natural yearnings of 
people should be satisfied, that liberal institutions should 
strive to fulfill human desires. Yet Lippmann's view of this 
process omitted a crucial step. He gave no philosophical 
attention to the ideal fruit for which liberal institutions 
reach. This is, perhaps, the greatest shortcoming of Lippmann 
(and of American political thought, as it is developed by him).
He failed in what Santayana calls "turning the friction of 
material forces into the light of ideal goods. "-*-2 He denied the 
natural, animal basis of the loftiest attainments of humanity. As
a young liberal, Lippmann accepted the desires of people —  but 
he thought they should be satisfied directly, in the material 
world; he ignored the abstract and spiritual goal of those 
desires. As an old conservative, Lippmann found an ideal in his 
doctrine of natural law, but it was an ideal chosen explicitly 
because it was irreconcilably opposed to the natural desires of 
humanity. Either way, Lippmann had nowhere meaningful to go. He 
was without the guidance of substantial ideals.
Given his outlook he had no way to connect the natural 
desires of humanity to its most sublime ideals —  particularly to 
ideals such as love. For Lippmann, ideals like love must remain 
bound to the material world. There is no resurrection or 
immortality possible for them. Their object is hopelessly 
grounded in the real world.
As will be evident below, Lippmann should be remembered more 
for his voyage than for the particular destinations that he 
reached. He explored and reflected tensions deep within American 
political thought. That he elucidated so many tensions is no mean 
feat. That he failed to resolve them is not grounds to dismiss 
him as a thinker. He did sincerely desire to make of them a 
single piece. That he clung too tightly to the past and the 
present, to the material and the real, is indeed a failure —  but 
it is a failure that is understandable, given the context of - 
mainstream American political thought.
It should not be forgotten that Lippmann argued for 
philosophy, not simply because he believed it to be a pleasant
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accompaniment to private life, but because he believed it to be a 
necessary aspect of public life. It is the task of others to 
continue this argument, and in so doing, to find the resurrection 
that Lippmann denied.
I. ECONOMIC DETERMINISM
- A. Introduction
It is axiomatic among academics that there is no surer
way for a foe to deliver himself to his enemies than for him
to write a book. Lippmann, who put more than ten million
words in print, never denied his critics their deliverance.
Of the lot, there was one book so rife with difficulties
that it served his critics at least as well as his admirers.
The book, The Good Society (1937), brought predictable
derision from the "left." Lewis Mumford (a target of
Lippmann's anti-collectivism) found within The Gdod Society
"confusions and contradictions...so massive as to be
intellectually discreditable in a man of his attainments."^
John Dewey thought the book gave "encouragement and practical
support to reactionaries" and described it as "liberalism 
„2m  a vacuum."
Lippmann's biographer Ronald Steel, who also used the
words "confusion" and "contradictions" to describe the book,
3said it suffered a "split personality." On its face,
Steel's description is correct; however, as will be shown, 
there is a strong theme throughout the book, a theme which 
Steel's interpretation obscures.
The first part of The Good Society argued that all 
collectivism —  which, as Lippmann -defined it, included
- 10 -
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communism, fascism, and the New Deal -—  is inherently
4totalitarian because it requires economic planning.
In sharp contrast, the second part of The Good Society
was nothing less than an enthusiastic primer for interventionist,
welfare state liberalism. Lippmann, stated Steel, "drew
up a blueprint —  including public works, social insurance,
and the abolition of monopolies —  that was not very different
from what FDR had been trying to achieve with the New Deal."^
Dicey, Mises and von Hayek, all of whom Lippmann cited
approvingly in the first half of the book, would have been
appalled by Lippmann's conclusion.
Early in The Good Society Lippmann stated, "To the
liberal mind, the notion that men can authoritatively plan
and impose a good life upon a great society is ignorant,
impertinent and pretentious." Collectivism is a throwback,
he argued; it necessarily accompanies an earlier mode of
production. Modern industrial production requires a division
of labor and a market economy, neither of which is compatible,
he asserted, with collectivism or planning. The state can
force collectivism upon a modern society, but such an
arrangement will only temporarily postpone the inevitable.
Collectivism is doomed to pass away. This process, Lippmann
insisted in The Good Society, is a "truly inexorable
7historic necessity."
Steel disagreed pointedly with Lippmann's economic 
explanation of totalitarianism. "His analysis," Steel charged, 
"assumed that economic collectivism produced totalitarianism,
-12-
gwhen, in fact, it was the other way around." Lippmann kept
looking for the economic basis, wrote Steel, because "he
wanted to believe that political and economic liberalism
9went hand in hand."
Steel, who seemed determined to offer his own views of
totalitarianism (he claimed its roots lie in "the emotional
appeal of mass movements with their mass loyalties and
mass enthusiasms"),1  ̂ .........  passed right over a crucial
distinction: Walter Lippmann did not "want to believe that
political and economic liberalism went hand in hand," he
believed it. More specifically, Lippmann argued repeatedly
that political and civic liberty were brought into being by
economic liberalism. In A Preface to Morals (1929) he stated:
our great-grandfathers.... found themselves in a world 
regulated by the customs and beliefs of a landed society. 
They could not operate their factories successfully in 
such a society, and they rebelled fiercely against the 
customs which restricfed them. That rebellion was 
rationalized in the philosophy of laissez-faire which 
meant in essence that machine industry must not be 
interfered with by landlords ahd peasants who had feudal 
fights, nor by governments which protected those rights. 
On the positive side this rebellion expressed itself 
in declarations of the rights of man. These declarations 
were a denial of the vested rights of men under the old 
landed order and an assertion of the rights of men, 
particularly the new middle-class men, who proposed to 
make the most of the new industrial and mechanical 
order.H
Similarly, in The Good Society Lippmann wrote that the
"ideal of equal and certain laws," a bulwark of modern
liberalism, "is hardly conceivable in an age of small,
12self-sufficient communities." As these two examples 
indicate, it can be shown that a powerful economic
-13-
determinism underlay the political philosophy of Walter 
Lippmann.
Steel failed his readers by refusing to explore Lippmann's 
position on this issue. Every time Lippmann’s determinism 
became so pronounced that Steel could not ignore it, he 
briefly noted Lippmann's contention, rebutted it, then passed 
on to another topic. Lippmann argued in A Preface to Morals, 
according to Steel, "that fascism and Bolshevism resulted 
from the 'breakdown of a somewhat primitive form of capitalism." 
Eight years later in The Good Society Lippmann, in Steel's 
words, "had modified h is argument to put the blame for 
totalitarianism on collectivism rather than on industrial
13backwardness. But he still sought the cause in economics."
Instead of pursuing the matter, Steel dismissed it, saying
that Lippmann did not understand "the emotional appeal of
either fascism or communism.... In truth the appeal of
authoritarianism reflected a side of human nature he was
14loath to recognize." Steel's interpretation belied all
that he wrote about‘Lippmann's insistence upon the irrational
aspects of humanity. Furthermore, Steel ignored the fact
that Lippmann explicitly argued in The Method of Freedom that
that the economy created the emotional, herdlike masses that
Steel claimed Lippmann did not acknowledge: "This submerging
of individualism in mass behavior is the consequence of the
15increasing complexity of the economic order." Lippmann 
also argued in The Method of Freedom that the loss of
-14-
economic security during the Depression drove men to an
"overwhelming p a s s i o n . " "The surrender of liberty, the
disenchantment with democracy, the revival of autocracy,"
all are manifestations of the desire to bring stability
16to the world economy.
Although Lippmann's economic determinism had its
internal inconsistencies, it was a consistent feature of
his work. In Drift and Mastery he stated that the "desire
for self-government" arose "with the accumulation of a great
surplus of wealth.... It wasn't easy to think much of the
possibilities of this world while he jmanj lived on the edge
17of starvation." Elsewhere in the same book he maintained
that only when society has emerged from "a fear economyI?
18will people be able to live in security and happiness. In
The Good Society he argued that the social order must be
adapted "to the economy brought into being by the industrial
19revolution...."
In the broadest terms Lippmann's economic determinism 
held that the mode of production (a) proceeds through definite 
historical stages and (b) is the locus of certain relations 
that determine the scope of human affairs, particularly 
political, cultural and intellectual affairs.
Since one thinker's name dominates all discussion of 
this interpretation of history and society, it is necessary —  
before proceeding —  to examine Lippmann's views of that 
man who was born in Trier, Prussia, 71 years before Lippmann 
was born on Lexington Avenue in New York City.
B. The Name That Launched a Thousand Arguments
-15-
In the course of his work, Lippmann quoted and paraphrased
arguments and observations from an extremely broad range of
sources: classical philosophers, their translators and
interpreters, political theorists and activists, psychoanalysts,
novelists, economists, social critics and theologians, artists
and art critics, biographers, historians, poets and politiicians.
His was an impressively eclectic, restless bibliography.
Among all these sources, one figure was treated most
curiously. This person appeared repeatedly in the text of
Lippmann's major books, disappeared for a while, then
tirelessly returned for another engagement. The person was
Karl Marx. His ideas were the springboard that launched many
a Lippmann argument: When Marx went down, Lippmann went up.
Yet for all of this, there was a conscious refusal to treat
20Marx's ideas systematically. The "Marxian tradition" and
a few selected quotes hover throughout the text —  from
Lippmann's first major book to the last ■—  but Marx himself
was never treated seriously:
For the study of politics I should say unhesitatingly 
that it is more important to know what socialist 
leaders, stump speakers, pamphleteers, think Marx 
meant, than to know what he said. For then you are 
dealing with living ideas.21
It could be argued that his statement was nothing more than
the tip of Lippmann's pragmatist view of the world. He
judged ideas not by the purity of their pedigree or elegance
of argument, but by their consequences. That would be a
plausible explanation, but Marx was the only major thinker
-16-
dismissed in this fashion by Lippmann. Lippmann did not
suggest that it is more important to know what the people
of Athens thought of Aristotle than to know what Aristotle
himself said. The same claim, if made about the authors of
The Federalist or other seminal works of American political
theory, would be hooted out of the ballpark, of political
science. (This is not to deny that the received view of
a thinker plays an important role in a full understanding,
but it is to say that without the original text there is
nothing to understand, no basis for subsequent interpretation
and clarification.)
Lippmann's attitude reduced Marx’s work to a sort of
assumption. What was taken for granted by Lippmann, the
reader never know;s. Steel reported that the young Lippmann
"read The Communist Manifesto and some of Karl Marx's
22shorter essays," but disliked what he found there. From 
this and Lippmann's extremely limited references to 
specific passages in Marx and Engels, one might safely 
conclude that Lippmann based his tireless critique (and 
mis-plagiarism?) on a minute introduction to the actual thing.
C. Lippmann's Attack on Marx's Economic Determinism 
Lippmann’s critique of Marx began in A Preface to 
Politics, his first book. He reduced Marxism to two concepts: 
First, "we are the creatures of economic conditions," and 
second, "a war of classes is being fought everywhere in 
which the proletariat will ultimately capture the industrial
-17-
machinery and produce a sound economic life as the basis of
23peace and happiness for all." The "singlemindedness" of 
the Marxist approach "has done good service." It has "helped 
men to think socially," turned their attention from the 
romantic view of history and "engendered a fine concern about
average people, about the voiceless multitudes who have
24been left to pass unnoticed." This constituted the essence 
and nearly the entirety of Lippmann's complimentary remarks 
about Marx. (The young Lippmann, riding high perhaps on his 
brief fling with the avant garde of Greenwich Village, 
referred to Marx as the political thinker who had exercised 
the greatest influence in the western world.)
In A Preface to Politics Lippmann denounced "economic 
determinism" as a "disastrous" creed "when it comes time to 
act.... You are likely to wait for something to determine 
you. Personal initiative and individual genius are poorly
25regarded." Further, "the philosophy of class warfare.... 
can be effective only so long as the working class is without 
sovereignty. But no sooner has it achieved power than a new
2 goutlook is needed in order to know what to do with it...."
In Public Opinion Lippmann assailed the "economic interpretation
27of history" as an "instinctive fatalism...." He claimed
that Marxism errs when it claims "that men's economic
position would irresistibly produce a clear conception of
28their economic interests." That is wrong, argued Lippmann, 
because "nothing is more certain than that all classes of
-18-
men are in constant perplexity as to what their interests 
, ,29are.
Before proceeding, it must be made clear that Lippmann
reduced "economic determinism" to a very narrow concern.
Gone was Marx's argument about the historical development
of the modes of production, gone was Marx's dialectical
relationship between the base and superstructure.^ Reading
Lippmann's text symptomatically, one might hypothesize that
this omission indicates Lippmann's basic acceptance of these
points. As will be shown, this hypothesis finds supportive
evidence in Lippmann's later works.
Lippmann's critique of economic determinism focused
exclusively on what might be called vulgar Marxian psychology.
If Marx and Lenin were correct, wrote Lippmann, economic
position ought to not only "divide mankind into classes, but
to supply each class with a view of its interest and a
31coherent policy for obtaining it." This notion, Lippmann
said, rests on the mistaken Marxian assumption
that men are capable of adopting only one version of 
their interest, and having adopted it, they move 
fatally to realize it.... That assumption is false.
A class interest can be conceived largely or narrowly, 
selfishly or unselfishly, in the light of no facts, 
some facts, many facts, truth and error.32
"A man's various economic contacts," wrote Lippmann, "limit
or enlarge the range of his opinions. But which of the
contacts, in what guise, on what theory, the materialistic
33conception of politics cannot predict.M
-19-
Lippmann acknowledged that a "man's various economic
contacts limit or enlarge the range of his opinions," and
he agreed with the notion that men who work at machines
will tend to interpret experience differently from handicraftsmen
or traders. He agreed that James Madison was correct in
saying in Federalist No. 10 that men are divided into factions
"by their relation to p r o p e r t y H o w e v e r , Lippmann continued,
Madison "does not say that their property and their
opinions are cause and effect,, but that differences of
property are the causes of differences of opinion." There
■' 34are many other causes of opinion.
Lippmann's attack on "economic determinism," therefore, 
can be reduced to two major contentions: (1) Since Lippmann
believed there is no such thing as a direct and unvarying 
connection between reality and human response (this contention 
is explored in Section III), he maintained that it is factually 
wrong to claim that the economy directly determines action 
or opinion. Instead, individuals adjust their actions or 
opinions in response to their individual experience of the 
environment. Since individuals' experience differ, Lippmann 
maintained at this point that the experience of the economic 
environment does not override the experience of other aspects 
of the environment. (2) Once people have perceived their
35interest, "how they shall pursue it is not fatally determined...."
To believe that men will innately pursue a certain end is to 
believe that.men possess what James called the "faculty of
acting in such a way as to produce certain ends, without
foresight of the ends and without previous education in
3 6the performance."
Lippmann believed, therefore, that "Marxian" determinism 
counseled a fatalistic aloofness from the struggles of 
the day.
...Karl Marx...undertakes to assure them, on the ground 
of his dialectic, that the struggle between capitalist 
and proletarian is the final conflict, that the issue 
is rigid, the result pre-determined, and that under 
communism man will 'leap from the kingdom of necessity 
to that of freedom'....^7
People who prefer to trust destiny, "a quick one or a slow
one," only seek to avoid "the whole task of judging events....
It is their aim "to escape the real effort of the imagination
38which is to weave a dream into the turning present." What
these people avoid is the development of self-consciousness,
the variable that determines whether people are "the victims
39or masters of change."
Those with "self-consciousness," then, are charged with 
a special responsibility. They must apply themselves, not 
to the distant, utopian future, but to that graspable point 
at which today turns into tomorrow. This raises a distinction 
which troubled Lippmann repeatedly when he proposed solutions 
to the problems of the day. Given the limits he placed on 
human knowledge, and given his belief that the future is, 
in James's phrase, pregnaant with "iffs," how far should the 
individual or society go in judgments about the issues pf 
the present? To not step in is fatalism. To step in with
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undue certainty is to attempt the impossible, for men’s actions
are merely interpositions in the flow of reality. To believe
that one has imagined the future is to foreclose unforeseen
possibilities. "In each child that is born there are
possibilities which no one can foresee.... That is why
liberty is one of the conditions of human progress," wrote
Lippmann. "Without it the dead hand of the past is forever
40upon the future."
The political philosophy of Edmund Burke —  of whom 
Lippmann thought highly —  resonates throughout the views 
of Lippmann here: There is a stolid resistance to any change
which is not founded on current circumstances and their 
direct needs. The limits of purposive activity, in 
Lippmann's view, must be near at hand, lest one group —  or 
generation —  claim a lofty role in history that pre-empts 
a future generation or destroys the contribution of a past 
generation. Fear of such purposive activity, it could be 
said, prompted Lippmann to resort to his own, peculiarly 
quietistic, economic determinism.
D. The Inexorable Economic Determinism of Walter Lippmann 
The introduction to this section stated that the 
economic determinism of Walter Lippmann consisted of the 
following broad beliefs: The mode of production (a) proceeds
through definite historical stages and (b) is the locus of 
certain relations that determine the scope of human affairs, 
particularly political, cultural and legal affairs.
Although the shape of Lippmann's determinism resembled
a vulgar reading of Marx, Lippmann's specific categories
were typically mirror opposites of Marx's: To Lippmann,
the proletariat was an unstable, potentially destructive
force; the property-owning middle class, in his estimation,
was the progressive force. Lippmann believed a stable,
prosperous society would necessarily be based on the private
ownership of property, exemplified by the middle class
life of modern capitalist countries.
Throughout human history, contended Lippmann, there has
been an evolution or historical progression from One technique
of production to another. The industrial age was preceded
by handicraft production, the "tillage of settled
agriculturists” by the "pastoral pursuits of nomadic tribes..*
Each productive technology brought into being an accompanying
mode of production or form of economic organization. Slavery,
feudalism and laissez faire capitalism are all stages in the
development of the mode of production. The industrial
revolution has "brought into being" a "new mode of production,
which is characterized by "the division of labor among
interdependent communities and individuals. This is the
42truly inexorable historic necessity."
Nothing can prevent the whole of mankind from being 
drawn out of its ancestral isolation into the world-wide 
economy of interdependent specialists. For the new 
mode of production is incomparably more efficient in 
the struggle for survival. The men who adopt it not 
only grow wealthier than those who do not, but they 
overrun and dominate those who do not.^3
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The distinguishing accomplishment of the division of labor
was the lifting of mankind beyond "a meagre and self-sufficing
• ’ ..44existence.
Productive technology, continued Lippmann, eventually
shapes not only the mode of production but all other
institutions and even human nature itself. The irresistible
progress of the mode of production has disrupted • "state, law,
property, family, church, human conscience, conceptions of
45right and wrong, of status, of expectation, of need...."
This "social heritage" has yet to catch up with the mode of
production, and thus there is "rebellion against the world
46or renunciation of the world." Since the industrial 
revolution
requires not only an alteration of the economy but a 
readaptation of human nature and of usage, it will be 
a long time before men have caught up with their 
changing circumstances arid have acquired the necessary 
knowledge to remake their habits and their institutions 
accordingly.47
Lippmann called the way.of life brought into being by 
the industrial revolution "liberalism." (Though he took up 
the cause of liberalism in The Good Society , it is important 
to remember that Lippmann was —  in other works —  frightened 
and repelled by the consequences of liberalism.) "Behind 
the liberal philosophy is the whole force of man's 
commitment to the economy of the division of labor...." The 
"necessities of the mode of production" compel men to 
discover and establish "the essential principles of a liberal 
society.
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One^ of the necessities of the modern mode of production 
is the protection and utilization of individual genius. For, 
Lippmann wrote, individual acts of invention and discovery 
drive forward the technology of production. By freeing 
the genius from the all-consuming demands of self-sufficiency, 
the division of labor allows the genius to expand human 
knowledge. Because others grew the food that, in Lippmann's 
example, Galileo ate; because others made the clothes he 
wore, Galileo was freed to study the heavens and earth. To 
do so he needed not only the division of labor but the 
protection of liberalism, for the multitudes — 1 the others 
within the division of labor — ■ constituted a threat to 
his work. Their irrational desires may have conflicted with 
his work, and —  if they were not restrained —  brought it 
to a half. "When a Galileo is coerced by a more powerful 
but a more ignorant inquisitor, his scientific genius is
49arbitrarily leveled down to the obscurantism of his masters."
To Lippmann the more powerful but more ignorant inquisitor 
may be an individual tyrant or an absolutist cabal or a 
mob, but in modern society it is most likely to be a duly 
constituted majority. Lippmann's liberalism forbade political 
interference —  by the majority or otherwise —  with the 
divis ion of labor.
Lippmann gave society no substantive purpose or overriding 
goal —  beyond the preservation of the division of labor 
and the individual freedoms which it created. This is 
Lippmann's chimera: The individual is free —  free to adjust
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to the elite-imposed definition of reality, free to adjust
to the compulsion of the economy, free to pursue the
objective truth, which is the truth that is workable within
the existing structure.
According to Lippmann, only liberalism is suitable to
the industrial society. "There is no choice" between
liberalism and any other way of life
because men are committed to the division of 
labor, and it is as impossible for them to live 
by any other means as it was for their ancestors 
in the villages clustered around regional market 
towns to exist without a high degree of 
self-sufficiency.
The "apparent choice" between the liberal order and any
51other way of life is "subjective?" it "exists only in
the mind.... The choice does not exist when they £men]
52come to find out what they can do."
Although maladjustments exist between liberalism 
and the industrial mode of production,
There is no reason to think that the time has 
come when the social order cannot adapt itself 
to the economy brought into being by the 
industrial revolution, and that, therefore, 
men must destroy the new economy. For that 
would mean that the industrial revolution 
itself had come to a dead end.59
Lippmann's conclusion, thus, was a simple and —  from the 
viewpoint of the existing economy —  optimistic one. Until 
industrial productive forces have been fully developed, the 
social order must adapt itself to the existing mode of 
production. When there is no more room for development, the 
social order will no longer be able to adapt itself to the mode 
of production. That point has not been reached, and, according to 
all the evidence Lippmann saw, it is far, far in the future.
The economic determinism of Walter Lippmann was, then, 
a philosophy that counseled individuals to allow the unfolding of 
the status quo and to trust in the decisions delivered by the 
market.®® Unlike Marx, who found the potential of the future 
alive within the present, Lippmann found the present bound 
securely to the past. Lippmann's determinism was conservative 
because the present and the past, rather than the future, were 
assigned causal force and primacy.
E. Leap from the Kingdom of Necessity to More Necessity
Lippmann held that it is not conscious choice but the 
inexorable progress of the technology of production that 
determines the mode of production. The consequences of the 
industrial revolution, for instance, cannot be reversed "by an 
act of will" or political coercion...."®-1- The existing mode of 
production will be transformed only by a revolutionary change in 
the technology of production.
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Until invention, which is as yet not even 
within the speculative possibilities, 
creates a more efficient and radically 
different method of producing wealth, 
mankind is committed to the division of 
labor in a market economy.62
Given this view, it was wise of Lippmann to offer an 
instrumental justification for the economy. It was wise because, 
according to the standard position on such matters, an end that 
is inexorably determined cannot at the same time be a properly 
ethical end. Therefore, an instrumental justification wins by 
default. Lippmann justified the modern mode of production on the 
grounds it is "incomparably more efficient," i.e., those who 
adopt it grow "wealthier" and "overrun and dominate those who do 
not."63 The Good Society consistently adhered to this argument.
...the basic economy of the division of 
labor regulated in markets is a mode of 
production, like village agriculture or 
pastoral nomadism. Men may like it or 
dislike it. That is an aesthetic 
preference, such as preferring the life of 
a hunter or a shepherd to that of a farmer or 
a factory worker. But a mode of production 
cannot be judged to be fundamentally justor unjust.
In short, Lippmann described.the economy as an amoral, seemingly 
autonomous entity. Lippmann described the economy as neither the 
conscious creation of individuals nor the work of some recognized 
social authority. Thus, since economic compulsion is not willed 
by any group or individual, Lippmann did not regard it as the 
exercise of arbitrary authority.
Despite all the determinism Lippmann built into his society,
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he left one entry point for free choice —  the "subjective" 
choice between liberalism and any other way of life.®5 
Objectively, there is no choice as to which way of life is suited 
to the modern mode of production. There is, however, a choice 
that "exists only in the mind...."®® That is enough of a basis, 
Lippmann believed, upon which to erect a standard of justice. The 
adjustment of the legal, political and cultural institutions to 
the mode of production can be judged in ethical terms, he 
claimed. "Questions of justice can arise...out of maladjustment 
of laws, institutions, education, and social custom to a 
particular mode of production."®7
Liberalism, Lippmann maintained, adjusts the "laws, 
institutions, education, and social custom" to the "mode of 
production." Totalitarianism, Lippmann argued, tries to adjust 
the economy to fit the law, institutions and customs —  but that, 
he insisted, is impossible: The economy is the determinative 
force. The modern economy, like the modern environment described 
in Section III, is too vast, too complex to be understood by 
humans, let alone consciously controlled. Lippmann held that 
people consciously adjust the "fictions" of the legal, political 
and cultural institutions to the economy.
The adjustment of the legal, political and cultural 
institutions is the personal task of individuals with "a strong 
desire" and "a growing capacity to be just...." They must be 
guided by moral standards which discourage the quest for 
privilege and the exercise of arbitrary power.®® Their goal is a
free society in which inequalities in the 
condition of men, in their rewards, and in 
their social status do not arise out of 
extrinsic and artificial causes —  out of 
the physical power to coerce, out of legal 
privilege, out of special prerogative, or 
out of fraud, sharp practice, necessitous 
bargaining.6 9
However, within the confines of Lippmann's economic
determinism, there existed no moral foundation upon which these
individuals could base their judgments. (Section II shows how
Lippmann attempted to solve this dilemma by locating objectively
knowable values in his doctrine of natural law.) Within
Lippmann's economic determinism, no outside point of appeal
exists: Lippmann asserted that questions of justice should be
resolved according to the standard of the economy. The abolition
of poverty, for instance, which the young Lippmann described as
"the most immediate question before the world t o - d a y , s h o u l d
be accomplished by a redistribution of income which preserves
"the equilibrium of the exchange economy itself. "71-
Redistribution must be accomplished not through a "mere leveling
of incomes by taking from the rich and giving doles to the poor,
a process which eventually paralyzes and impoverishes the entire
economy, but through "measures which promote the efficiency of
the markets as regulators of the division of labor...."72 The
"true line of progress is not to impair or to abolish the market
but to maintain and improve it." The "uncompleted task" is "to
show how law and public policy may best be adapted to this mode
of production...."73
Given this circular arrangement, the question must finally
be asked: Did Lippmann do anything other than that for which he
-30-
denounced Marx? Could one not readily conclude that Lippmann's 
economic determinism is an "instictive fatalism," a "disastrous" 
creed "when it comes time to act?"
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II. NATURAL LAW
"Like a harlot," states Danish philosopher Alf Ross, "natural 
law is at the disposal of everyone. The ideology does not exist that 
cannot be defended by an appeal to the law of nature." Natural law has 
been used to defend reform, reaction and revolution.
Since Lippmann rejected the belief that what is right is 
determined by public opinion or by the majority; since he was 
skeptical about all political dogma? and since he preferred hierarchy 
and stability to equality and change, it is not surprising that he came 
to advocate a conservative doctrine of natural law. Not only is the 
content of Lippmann' s natural law conservative, it has authoritarian 
implications: Lippmann's natural law is knowable only by an elite. 
"Not everyone," Lippmann states, can know natural law; "most people, 
presumably, may have heard almost nothing about it."2
In broadest terms, natural law -- as distinct from Lippmann's 
natural law —  can be capsulized as the appeal to God, nature or human 
nature as the source of objective standards for ethics, politics and 
law. ̂ on the whole (although important exceptions exist), advocates 
of natural law look for purposes in the world, either of God, humanity 
or nature. Natural law theorists emphasize reason as humanity's 
distinguishing characteristic and try to establish a set of moral 
principles on which rational people can agree.
Lippmann was concerned neither with standard natural law issues, 
nor with a consistent presentation of his views of natural law. In The 
Good Society and The Public Philosophy he made all of he following
epistemological claims, without following any discernible pattern. 
At times he claimed natural law is what is required for social order 
and convenience;  ̂ at times he stated it provides normative 
principles, it prescribes what behavior "should be."® At one point he 
asserted it is not crucial whether natural law is "the commandment of 
God or the reason of things. . . . . At another he argued that natural law 
is a truth "proclaimed by the Christian gospel.... For in the 
recognition that there is in each man a final essence —  that is to say, 
an immortal soul —  which only God can judge, a limit was set upon he 
dominion of men over men."^ At various other points he maintained 
natural law is known through experience,® through "rational 
inquiry,"® and through i n t u i t i o n . I n  The Public Philosophy he 
stated, "It is there objectively." Thinkers have agreed, he 
continued, that it is "not something decided upon by certain men and 
then proclaimed by them. It was not someone's fancy, someone's 
prejudice, someone's wish or rationalization, a psychological 
experience and no more."11 in The Good Society he asserted that "this 
higher law is...a progressive discovery of men striving to civilize 
themselves. . .its scope and implications are a gradual revelation that 
is by no means completed.
Lippmann's conception of natural law, thus, could be said to be 
both classical and modern.1® Attributing it to the classical period, 
he stated that its discovery "preceded the advance of modern science 
and the industrial revolution," and that people have acted upon it for 
"over two thousand years. . . ,"14 Yet in a distinctly modern argument, 
he stated that the natural law of property was founded on the 
recognition that certain things "are not provided in unlimited
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quantity and without effort."^5 He acknowledged the "new school of 
natural law, which flourished from about 1500 to 1800," but asserted 
this school was unable "to cope with the pluralism of the later modern 
age... ."I6 instead of trying to situate his view amidst classical and 
modern natural law, he claimed there are "fundamental principles" 
common to all schools of natural law. These principles are
in Cicero ' s words, 1 law is the bond of civil 
society,' and that all men, governors and 
the governed, are always under, are never 
above, laws; that these laws can be 
developed and refined by rational 
discussion, and that the highest laws are 
those upon which all rational men of good 
will, when fully informed, will tend to 
agree.17
If one accepts this definition and puts aside the problems with 
the derivation and substance of Lippmann's natural law, it is possible 
to develop a preliminary sense of the role of Lippmann's natural law. 
This role could be expressed in terms of a triadic relationship (an 
heuristic device that Lippmann does not use). There are three 
determining forces at work in the model: natural law, human nature and 
circumstance. Lippmann regarded the unchanging part of human nature 
as basically uncivilized. (This issue is taken up in detail later in 
this section.) Lippmann described circumstance as almost stationary 
for those millions of people outside the grasp of modernity, for those 
people confined to the rhythms of primitive agriculture. With the 
arrival of the scientific and industrial age, the human environment is 
set to rocking. New circumstances, new objects, produce new reactions 
from human impulse. With relentless force, history works "upon the 
inner springs of being" and inevitably undermines the "premises of
-34-
conduct."18 The triadic relationship loses its balance. The barbaric 
tide seizes upon one of the three elements and spurns the balance 
provided by the other two. Those who fixate upon human nature 
typically believe that people are inherently good and naturally wise. 
They would build institutions to fulfill people's every desire. They 
allege that an omnicompetent citizenry can rule through a pure 
democracy. (Given Lippmann's pessimistic view of human nature, he 
believed the actual result of this view is to enf lame self-interested 
desire and empower the will to dominate; totalitarianism is its 
consequence.) Those who raise circumstance above the other elements 
are a diverse group; they include those.who hold there is no more 
meaning in existence than the intensity of passing experience. They 
have no standard of right, no connection to the society from which they 
spring. It is the philosopher' s task to put the three elements back in 
their proper.relation. Lippmann believed natural law shows people how 
to adjust their lives and dreams to the necessities of circumstance. 
He thought natural law shows which natural desires must be restrained, 
which evil can be eliminated, and that it provides the faith to live 
with that darkness which cannot be destroyed.
B. Finding Natural Law
Lippmann began his career with realism and naturalism in 
ascendancy. He belittled a priori knowledge and flowery principles. 
The old politics, he charged, did not succeed because it attempted "to 
harness mankind to abstract principles —  liberty, justice or
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equality —  and to deduce institutions from these high-sounding 
words."19 Such politics failed, he explained, because those 
abstractions are time-bound and empty: "...it is not very
illuminating to say, for example, that the principles of 
righteousness are eternal.... The Golden Rule in a village, and the 
Golden Rule for a nation of a hundred million are two very different 
things."20 Instead of following the.old truths, people should find 
their own, individual truth: "No formula can express ultimate
experience.. . .each man in his inward life is a last judgment on all his 
values."21
Rules of conduct, abstractions, laws nd social arrangements must 
be tested continually and empirically, Lippmann urged, then modified 
to suit changing circumstance. However, once such rules and forms have 
served their historical function, they should be swept away: 
"Nowadays you still come across some of these, ancient notions, 
especially in courts, where they do no little damage in perverting 
justice; but they are ghost-like and disreputable, gibbering and 
largely helpless."22 Politics should not attempt to hold humans to 
abstract standards conceived intuitively or otherwise derived from 
the air. Standards, instead, should be shaped to fit real human 
desire. Lippmann advocated a new politics that "proposes to fit creeds 
and institutions to the wants of men, to satisfy their wants as fully 
and beneficially as possible."23 He regarded human desire as 
potentially beneficial.
By the end of his career, his opinions were dramatically 
different. He had swung around and embraced the Golden Rule: "Thus the 
Golden Rule is the moral maxim which establishes itself when men
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recognize others as autonomous persons, when they acknowledge the 
inalienable manhood of other m e n . "24 He saw human nature as 
acquisitive, self-interested and domineering; it must be restrained, 
not fulfilled. Truth, he held, could be objectively known by all 
rational humans. He no longer denounced abstract principles as a 
facade for the time-bound truths of previous generations; he found 
instead certain of these principles to be necessary for the survival 
of civility. His pragmatic epistemology (as shown in Section III) , saw 
the whole as not really a whole, but as something changing in such a 
manner that the future cannot be predicted. The mature Lippmann held 
that certain knowledge of the whole is possible —  that there is an 
unchangeable and knowable aspect of the universe.
Although these changes were drastic, there was some continuity 
between the two positions. From he beginning he had argued for 
standard-bearers of various types: the statesman (who could refine 
the masses's desires) , the expert and scientist (who could refine the 
view of the environment). Lippmann consistently recognized the need 
for standards —  it was the nature of the standard that kept changing. 
This is a general problem throughout his works: He is continually 
searching for authority, for a point of orientation for the collective 
compass of humanity. (Lippmann found liberalism only patially able to 
fill this need.)
In A Preface to Morals, Lippmann grew noticeably more concerned 
about the difficulties of modernity. Realism, he felt, had been overly 
successful; now the balance had to be swung in the opposite direction. 
Politics had been exposed as something much less than crystalline 
fluid coursing through silver forms laid down by the Constitution. The
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"acids of modernity" had reduced the human universe to a place without 
purpose or authoritative belief. Belief had been destroyed, he 
stated, by forces epochal in scope: science, protestantism,
technology, the rapid pace of social and economic change.
Lippmann argued in A Preface to Morals for a moralism that is a 
codified version of the behavior which best fits reality. Moses, for 
instance, knew the Ten Commandments before they were engraved in stone
—  they had been revealed in the experience of his people; they were 
carried forward in tradition and customary behavior. The theme of 
Lippmann' s moralism was the necessity to adjust to reality. Instead of 
adjusting human institutions to fit the wants of humans, he suggested 
adjusting the wants of humans to.fit reality. He advocated self- 
restraint and "disinterestedness," the minimizing of self-interest.
In his distinctive and contradictory style he —  on the one hand -
- endorsed the stance of modern science, which he reduced to the 
statement that the universe is indifferent to the needs of humanity. 
Yet, on the other hand, he placed science among the acids of modernity; 
it destroys humans' capacity to believe, it corrodes the purposes of 
humanity. Moreover, science does not produce a satisfactory ethic to 
replace that which it undermines. As a sort of compromise solution, 
Lippmann developed a rational humanism. As laid out in A Preface to 
Morals, it was one of his most eloquent and moving pieces of work. 
Spinoza is an important point of reference. Jesus stands on the same 
footing as Buddha, both are mortals who teach people how to live 
ethically for a reward in the here and now. The Eternal Creator and 
Judge does not stand over all.
As moving as his argument was,, substantial difficulties lay
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within it. Lippmann aimed to disprove the teleological interpretation 
of the universe. He argued, in effect, against classical natural law 
(which holds that natural beings have predetermined ends and that 
these ends determine a hierarchically ordered definition of what is 
right). So insistent was Lippmann upon breaking with hedonism, 
perfectionism and other doctrines with an asserted end that he tended 
to vanquish ends altogether. In accepting.science ' s non-teleological 
interpretation of the non-human world, he embraced a non-teleological 
view of humanity. But he could not sustain that position. He found it 
impossible (and undesirable) to adequately account for human ends 
within the terms of science —  in physico-chemical impulses or 
conditioned reflexes, for instance. Even within A Preface to Morals, 
the teleological perspective reappeared in places:
...if civilization is to be coherent and 
confident it must be known in that 
civilization what its ideals are. There 
must exist in the form of clearly available 
ideas an understanding of what the 
fulfillment of the promise of that . 
civilization might mean, an imaginative 
conception of the good at which it might, 
and, if it is to flourish, at which it must aim.25
With the passage of time, Lippmann moved to find purposive order and 
essential regulative principles within human existence. In The Good 
Society Lippmann's standards were no longer presented as a matter of 
individual choice. They took the form of natural law. Their exact 
derivation may have been unclear, but their function was apparent. 
Lippmann's natural law held together a changeable, plural society.
He argued for a modern natural law, one that had been summoned up 
by the pioneer liberals of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to
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dissolve the vestiges of feudalism and "make possible the emergence of 
the new social o r d e r . "26 The merchants and manufacturers who gained 
control of he new state made the law the guarantor of property and 
contracts, "and they called the guarantee a natural right. Thus, as 
Roscoe Pound has said, the legal rights of the eighteenth-century 
Englishmen came down to us as the rights of man. "27 In A Preface to 
Morals Lippmann stated that by the rights of man the industrialists 
"meant primarily freedom of contract, freedom of trade, freedom of 
occupation —  those freedoms, that is to say, which made it possible 
for the new employer to buy and sell, to hire and fire without being 
accountable to a n y o n e . "28
Having found that natural law in practice meant the traditionl 
law with all its injustices, Beintham and the radicals of the 
nineteenth century, continued Lippmann, reacted against the entire 
tradition. Their attack "brought down the humanist ideal in the crash 
of the supernatural order; and from it man, who had fancied himself a 
little less than the angels, emerged as much less than a m a n .  "29 Humans 
were reduced to "a mere physico-chemical system or a bundle of
conditioned reflexes ."30 with man degraded to "a bundle of
conditioned reflexes...al1 the landmarks of judgment were gone and 
there remained only an aimless and turbulent moral relativity." 
"Having conceived man as a being without autonomy, they could not 
believe he had authentic purposes, inalienable rights or binding 
obligations...."31 The doctrine opposed to natural rights led, 
Lippmann argued, to totalitarianism.
To restore the standard of human inviolability, Lippmann argued, 
it is necessary to reestablish natural law —  a natural law, it should
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be noted, that involves a teleological view of humanity.
As Lippmann was well aware, the forces which he brought together 
do not rest easily with one another. He held at one spot that human 
rights were brought into being by the modern economy, and —  as shown 
in Section I —  he also held that the irresistible progress of the mode 
of production disrupts "state, law, property, family, church, human 
conscience, conceptions of right and wrong, of status, of 
expectation, of n e e d . . . . "32 a s  a result there is continuing 
"rebellion against the world or renunciation of the w o r l d . "33
He first said that ethics, laws and institutions must be adjusted 
to the mode of prouction. Then, in The Public Philosophy, he contended 
natural law is normative. The economy, he advisedd, should be adjusted 
to his doctrine of natural .law. Lippmann was not dissatisfied with 
this contradiction; he held that it cannot be resolved, that it should 
not be resolved. In Lippmann's view "man must work out his destiny in 
the balance, which is never fixed finally between the t w o . "34 This 
view, he stated, has always been challenged. There are .those who would 
set their standards entirely by the material realm, "the hedonists who 
would withdraw wholly into the realm of existence, to eat, to drink, 
and be merry without the pains and the qualms that go with immortal 
yearnings." There are also those perfectionists who believe "that by 
their own revolutionary acts men can make themselves the creators of 
heaven on this e a r t h .  "35 This is the error of the "modern democratic 
gospel," which promises, "not the good life of this world, but the 
perfect life of h e a v e n . "36 The-root of all these confusions is the 
failure to recognize that the two realms "are inseparable but 
disparate.. . . "37 0n the one hand, "the two realms cannot be fused; " on
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the other, "they cannot be separated and isolated." They must "be 
related by striking, maintaining, redressing a balance between 
them."38
C. Using Natural Law
The function of values in Lippmann's conception of natural law is 
relatively clear. As will be shown, they (a) serve as a standard of 
appeal in ultimate social and political decision-making, (b) control 
radical unbelief and deal with the tension between individual 
autonomy and civil order, and (c) check the force of an unbridled 
democracy.
(a) a standard of appeal
Lippmann invoked higher law "against the material powers" of 
actual rulers as an "immaterial power" which they "can be compelled to 
r e s p e c t . ... "39 -phe laws and institutions to which Lippmann's natural 
law leads have.as their goal "the victory of persuasion over force."4® 
When people adopt natural law, they agree to "the same criteria and 
rules of reason for arriving at the truth and for distinguishing good 
and evil...." When people agree upon how these matters are settled, 
all issues can be decided within free political institutions.41
The specification of natural law is the effort "by which men have 
sought to exorcise the devil of arbitrariness in human
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relations. ..."42 The means which they have employed 
"Constitutional restraints and bills of rights, the whole apparatus 
of responsible government and of an independent judiciary, the 
conception of due process of law in courts, in legislature, among 
executives" —  all "depend upon moral commitments which could never 
possibly be expressly stated in the laws themselves...."4  ̂Lippmann 
situated these commitments within his doctrine of natural law; they 
include
a level of truthfulness in giving 
testimony, of reasonableness in argument, 
of trust, confidence, and good faith in 
transactions...a mood of disinterested­
ness and justice, far above anything that 
the letter of the law demands.44
Only by adherence to these unwritten higher laws can people "make
actual law effective or have criteria by which to reform it."4^
Lippmann held the specific laws and institutions which abide by
his doctrine of natural law could be arrived at through a process based
on consensus. Practicality or workability is a crucial criteria to
guide the discussion of which specific laws or institutions deserve
support. These pragmatic criteria, however, are not enough. Unless
higher law is also satisfied, specific laws will not work. For
example, when the laws of private property were interpreted "as an
absolute right," confrontation was inevitable between "those who
owned the earth" and "those who had nothing to lose."4  ̂An absolute
right to property, consecrated in law, meant there was "no connecting
bond, no consensus within the same realm of rational discourse"
between property holders and the propertyless.4  ̂The truly enduring
basis for property laws is the recognition that "ownership is a grant
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made by the laws to achieve not...private purposes but the common 
social purpose. "49 The rational, natural justification of property is 
found in the belief that the earth "is the general property of all 
mankind."50 Under changing circumstances, the system of private 
property "must be kept in accord with the grand ends of civil 
society."51 Similar principles stand behind other laws, although 
Lippmann did not exhaustively derive them.
(b) control radical unbelief, reconcile autonomy and order
Lippmann*s doctrine of natural law provided a foundation for 
belief and a limit to radical unbelief.
When people lose "the traditional theory of the purpose of life," 
they are likely to hold that "all facts are equally good and equally 
bad," that moral values are "ultimately a delusion.... "52 Experience 
comes to have "no meaning beyond that which each man can find in the 
intense realization of each passing moment." Experience possesses "no 
underlying significance, man himself has no station in the universe, 
and the universe has no plan which is more than a drift of 
circumstances, illuminated here and there by flashes of self- 
consciousness . "53
Lippmann posed a critical question to those who hold such a 
radical belief: Do they "believe that a man is able 'to experience a 
reality absolutely independent of himself'"?54 Lippmann singled out 
Jean Paul Sartre from among those who answer "no" to this question. The
-44-
radical unbelief...is in Sartre's saying 
that, 'if I have done away with God the 
Father, someone is needed to invent 
values.. .life has no meaning a priori... it 
is up to you to give it a meaning, and value 
is nothing but the meaning that you 
choose.'
With this, Sartre has done away not 
only with God the Father but with the 
recognition that beyond our private worlds 
there is a public world to which webelong.55
Lippmann condemned Sartre and those other modern philosophers who 
have ceased to believe that behind natural law "there is any kind of 
independent reality that can be known and must be recognized."56 
condemned them because they deny that there is a "transcendent" law, 
one that is not "someone's prejudice, someone's wish or 
rationalizatin, a psychological experience and no more."57 Lippmann 
believed that such a law exists "objectively, not subjectively. It can 
be discovered. It has to be obeyed."58
Thus, the conditions "which must be met if there is to be a good 
society are there, outside our wishes, where they can be discovered by 
rational inquiry, and developed and adapted and refined by rational 
discussion." "If what is good, what is true, is only what the 
individual 'chooses' to 'invent,' then we are outside the traditions 
of civility. We are back in the war of all men against all men...."59 
Lippmann held that society may wish to accommodate those who 
reject natural law, those who place themselves at odds with its 
principals. If such dissenters abide by the "sovereign principle" of 
his doctrine —  that we live in a rational order in which by sincere 
inquiry and rational debate we can distinguish the true and false, the 
right and wrong —  then "they may continue to seek the truth."50
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However, if they would "exploit the ignorance" or "incite the 
passions" of the people, or if they reject the procedure by which 
official policy is determined, then they have rejected the sovereign 
principle of natural law, and have exceeded the limit to dissent. 
Therefore, they no longer have the right to speak freely.61
(c) check unbridled democracy
Lippmann found democracy and his doctrine of natural law to be 
locked in an antagonistic relationship with one another. That is to 
say, what Lippmann calld "pure" democracy —  political equality and 
majority rule —  is the enemy of his natural law.
Democracy empowers a new monarch, claimed Lippmann, whose person 
is the masses. Pure democracy "emasculates the sovereignty of the 
people; for if the supreme lawmaking power is entrusted to the 
representatives of a transient majority, they can at any time 
disenfranchise not only the minority but the majority as well...."62 
Pure democracy is "really brute, inchoate democracy, and the certain 
foundation of absolutism."63
Lippmann regarded he furtherance of democracy as a direct attack 
on his principles of natural law. Conversely, he believed his 
principles of natural law are capable of containing the democratic 
thrust.
I am a liberal democrat and have no wish to 
disenfranchise my fellow citizens. My hope 
is that both liberty and democracy can be 
preserved before the one destroys the
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other . Whether this can be done is the 
question of our t i m e . 64
He claimed that, in historical terms, the principles of natural law
precede democracy:
The Bill of Rights (1689) is more than two 
centuries older than universal suffrage in 
Great Britain. The enfranchised people did 
not establish the rule that all powers are 
under the law, that laws must be made, 
amended and administered by due process, 
that a legitimate government must have the 
consent of the governed.
I dwell upon this point because it ' 
throws light upon the fact...that the 
enfranchised masses have not, surprisingly 
enough, been those who have most staunchly 
defended the institutions of freedom.65
Lippmann conceived natural law as a restraint and governor on the 
appetites and passions which the democratic doctrine encourages and 
e m p o w e r s .66 His natural law led people not to democracy but to 
nomocracy, a society of law, with an officialdom of judges and 
judgelike legislators and executives. He argued that the temper of all 
officialdom "must be predominantly judicial: that holds not only for 
the judges themselves but for the legislators and executives as well, 
indeed for all who wish to serve the public i n t e r e s t . " 67  This is 
because a judge understands "that he is not there to impose his will 
but to judge among visible claimants and invisible i n t e r e s t s . . . . " 68
When the legislator ceases to think of 
himself as an impartial judge among 
contending interests, he soon adopts an 
imperial view of his function. He ceases to 
judge causes among the people: he issues 
commands to the people, and regards himself 
no longer as the representative of their 
true will but as the providential contriver 
of their destiny. Against this imperial 
view of the state...the liberal movement 
has always fought.68
Here Lippmann again faced his unresolved tension between the 
right and the good. It was unresolved because he never decided whether 
the right is the maximization of the good (as is the case in^a 
teleological view) or whether the right is determined independently
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and has priority over, the pursuit of the good (as is the case in a non- 
teleological or deontological view). At this point in Lippmann's 
argument he swung strongly away from a teleological view. He denied 
that the "purposes, plans, and management of a social order in the 
future" are knowable.^O
Lippmann was stalked by fear of a mass telocracy, the popular 
democracy whose members hold a common telos. He assumed the worst of 
such an arrangement, seeing it as pure, unbridled will, a behemoth 
motivated by the crudest desire —  an absolutism as rank as fascism. To 
him, it was not a remote danger, a tangent possibility, but a present 
tendency, an almost preponderant force in modernity.
Lippmann's error was to collapse democracy into telocracy. He 
saw the masses as inherently concerned with the maximization of the 
good, he saw them as without an understanding of the right. Lippmann's 
positiion, however, is self-serving, for he himself remained unclear 
in his own views about the right.
D. Growing Negative about Humanity
When Lippmann was young and held a relatively optimistic view of 
human nature/ he did not espouse a doctrine of natural law. That is 
regrettable, for if he had, he perhaps would have added something 
creative and hopeful to natural law thinking. Instead, it was in part 
his increasingly pessimistic view of human nature which brought him to 
develop his doctrine of natural law, and it was this view of human 
nature which assured that his natural law would be conservative and —
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one is forced to say frightened of the future.
As noted in the introduction to this section, the young Lippmann 
believed that institutions should be adjusted to human desire. In A 
Preface to Morals he referred to this stance as the outlook of the 
liberals: "If they thought that man was naturally innocent and good, 
they have accepted some one of the many variants of liberalism, and 
concerned themselves not with the reform of desire but with the 
provision of opportunities for its f u l f i l l m e n t ."72 The young Lippmann 
insisted that liberal institutions should strive to provide such 
opportunities.
However, A Preface to Morals also recognized a deep-seated 
tension within such an arrangement. When human nature "is naively 
trusted, it produces so much disorder and corruption that men once 
again idealize order and restraint."73 The inevitable result, he 
stated, is a reaction against the liberal view and a swing of the 
pendulum back to the conservative view of human nature:
If they thought their natural impulses were 
by way of being lecherous, greedy, and 
cruel, they have accepted some form of 
classical and Christian doctrine that man 
must subdue his naive impulses, and by 
reason, grace, or renunciation, transform 
his will.74
On the balance, the young Lippmann concluded, "No particular view [of 
human nature] e n d u r e s . "^5
However, the mature Lippmann regarded human nature much 
differently. In A Preface to Morals, which can be regarded as a 
transitional book, he referred to "the naive and imperious lust of our 
infantile natures...."76 in The Good Society he wrote of "the
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primitive and persistent impulse to dominate,.to submit, to stand in 
awe of power and to seek its protection;"77 he also defined the 
"instinctive" political philosophy: "For every man, until he has been 
taught differently, is predisposed to believe that what he wills 
should have the force of law.1,78 In The Public Philosophy he denounced 
"the disposition of our first natures, of our natural and uncivilized 
selves," characterizing these beliefs as the "delusion of men that 
they are gods...."79
Having moved to this negative view of human nature, Lippmann 
argued that these natural desires "must undergo a 
transvaluation...."80 people must cease to desire that which causes 
evil. The Good Society no longer defined liberalism as the view which 
concerns itself with the fulfillment of human desire: " .. .the logic of 
liberalism calls for...the inordinately difficult conquest of man's 
lower nature by his higher nature."81 in The Public Philosophy 
Lippmann's doctrine of natural law mandated "the government of our 
appetites and passions by the reason of a second, civilized and 
therefore, acquired nature."82 What the young Lippmann had called 
liberalism was now strikingly close to what The Public Philosophy 
denounced as the doctrine of "the hard totalitarian Jacobins of the 
twentieth century... ."83 "Relying upon the inherent rightness of the 
natural impulses of man's first nature, the Jacobin theory does away 
with the second civilized nature...."84 "instead of ruling the 
elemental impulses, they stimulated and armed them."85
What is it, one must ask Lippmann, that the "elemental impulses" 
desire? That they seek domination is clear; but Lippmann did not 
always regard domination to be harmful; in many situations he took
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hierarchical organization, one form of dominance, to be natural and 
beneficial. So the desire to dominate is not to be eliminated but 
somehow shaped to fit within the form of the existing social 
organization. What is difficult to understand, though, is how those on 
the bottom of the hierarchy are to justify eliminating their natural 
desire to dominate, while those on the top are to justify their desire 
as natural and beneficial.
There is yet another disturbing vagueness about the sort of 
objects the elemental impulses desire. Lippmann suggested, when he 
referred to heaven on earth, that people naturally desire utopia —  
immortality amidst peace and super-abundance. But he also gave a much 
more materialistic and down-to-earth cast to what people naturally 
desire: "...there are not objects enough in the world to fulfill all 
human d e s i r e s . " ^  where, one interjects, would one draw the line 
between primitive desires and civilized ones? Is a nomadic African, 
for instance, whose children are dying of starvation guilty of naive 
desire for wishing there would be water where none has fallen for 
thirty months? Is it civilized to demand material incentives in the 
form of tax deductions before one will contribute funds to a well- 
digging program for the African family? Is it naive to desire not 
simply remuneration for one's work, but other, intangible forms of 
reward, such as a sense of accomplishment?
Lippmann's open-ended treatment of the dividing line between 
naive and civilized desire could be read as an invitation to 
continually and publicly debate such issues. However, his 
consistently elitist bias, which emphasized knowledge accessible to 
only a few, indicated the opposite.
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Public discussion of these matters might reveal that there is not 
an inevitable tension between people’s natural desires and the 
requirements of civilized life. Young Lippmann, it would seem, was on 
the right track when he argued against the separation of the natural 
and the higher instincts. Forcing such a division ignites what 
Santayana called "a war between nature and morality....
As one instinct after another becomes 
furious or disorganized, cowardly or 
criminal, under these artificial restric­
tions, the public and private conscience 
turns against it [nature] all its 
forces....nature is rendered vicious and 
overlaid with pruriency, artifice, and the 
love of novelty.... Thus the disorder in 
man’s life and disposition, when grown 
intolerable, leads him to condemn the very 
elements out of which order might have been 
constituted, and to mistake his total confusion for his total depravity.87
Contrary to the mature Lippmann, repression and self-alienation 
are not necessities. Civility can rest upon natural desire. It is 
possible to change the environment to eliminate many causes of 
alienation. A harmonious order may be possible, or at least an order 
that believes people naturally desire goods that are not destructive 
of harmony. John Rawls, for instance, has developed a persuasive 
argument for what he calls "the Aristotelian Principle": "other
things being equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized 
capacities {their innate or trained abilities) , and this enjoyment 
increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater its 
complexity."®® Exercise of the Aristotelian Principle is rewarding to 
both the doer and the observer:
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As we witness the exercise of well-trained 
abilities by others, these displays are 
enjoyed by us and arouse a desire that we 
should be able to do the same things 
ourselves. We want to be like those persons 
who can exercise the abilities that we find 
latent in our nature.89
Other, more general human needs and potentialities could be 
specified and elaborated, and natural law deduced from them. 
Political philosopher Sigmund has suggested social cooperation, 
equality, freedom and "more difficult of accomplishment, community 
and love...."90
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III. OBJECTIVITY
A. Context of Walter Lippmann*s Theory of Objectivity
The orthodox view holds that Lippmann's book Public Opinion 
(1922) helped free the main current of Anglo-American political 
science from the deep, still backwater of the formal-legal 
paradigm.1 in a review article on the "science" of the state, 
Harry Eckstein refers to Lippmann as one of the writers who 
developed a "sort of counterscience" to the formal-legal 
s y n t h e s i s . 2 Eckstein maintains that, as a result of the work of 
Lippmann and others, political science was rejuvenated by an 
infusion of novel subjects —  mass parties, interest groups, 
public opinion and so forth.
Lippmann is among those writers to whom Michael Curtis 
attributes the "psychological approach to politics." Writing in 
The Great Political Theories, Curtis states that the 
psychological movement was stimulated "by a disenchantment by 
some over the preoccupation of traditional political philosophy 
with formal institutions of government and law and with 
moralizing about rights, duties and freedoms."3 Similarly, Robert 
Ezra Park contends that, on its publication, Lippmann's Public 
Opinion was the best text to date "for the social psychological 
interpretation of politics.
Lippmann had been introduced to social psychology by one of
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its founders, the lapsed Fabian socialist Graham Wallas. To 
Wallas's work, Lippmann brought his own political theory plus a 
smattering of Freudian psychoanalysis. The result was Public 
Opinion, the book which Lippmann's biographer Ronald Steel says 
"pushed beyond the sterile doctrines of traditional political 
science and helped spawn whole schools of inquiry: public opinion 
polls, academic courses, scholarly journals, even graduate 
degrees. ”5
This thesis, however, argues that Public Opinion contributed 
less to building up political science and more to tearing it 
down. Authors such as Lippmann could make a persuasive case 
against formal-legalism, but they had difficulty erecting a new 
paradigm to replace it.6 overrun by behavioralists and systems 
theorists, seduced by research programs of varying ilk and 
stature, political science never attained the alleged rigor of 
the neoclassical synthesis of economics. Political science 
remains a would-be science, a discipline in search of a 
methodology.
Walter Lippmann, despite the implications of the orthodox 
point of view, never took seriously the pursuit of a method —  
for either himself or his discipline. From inception to 
conclusion, his work was that of a theorist. The mainstream of 
political science may have found in Public Opinion matters of 
interest to the methodological debate, but Lippmann himself had 
no methodology (unless classical political philosophy is regarded 
as a method); in fact, Lippmann did not even remain a firm 
believer in a generalized scientific method.7
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No, the orthodox interpretation of Public Opinion is not 
adequate. The book cannot be understood simply within the context 
of Anglo-American political science. It also must be judged as a 
piece of political theory. Lippmann was indeed assaulting formal- 
legalism, and he definitely used social psychology in his attack. 
However, this onslaught should not be interpreted as a fresh 
point of departure; instead it should be seen as the continuation 
of a long-standing battle. This is true both in terms of 
Lippmann's life and the much longer life of political theory. 
First, in regard to Lippmann, he used the psychological approach 
to argue for a position which he had staked out long before he 
took up the cause of social psychology —  a position which he 
held long after he lost interest in the psychological approach. 
Second, in regard to political theory, Political Opinion fits 
snugly within that portion of the liberal tradition concerned 
with the threat of the subjective, that nemesis which Locke 
described as "the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will 
of another man...."8 From its seminal works onward, liberalism 
did not champion liberation from all authority; it stood against 
arbitrary, irrational authority.9 Those who refined the work of 
Locke, particularly Adam Smith and David Hume, recognized "the 
limits of reason and the pervasiveness of irrational forces in 
man and society."10 Liberalism did not stand for the unlimited 
freedom of private judgment; instead, it attempted to delineate 
the subjective's proper sphere of influence. What began as an 
attack on capricious and arbitrary rule, as personified by the 
monarch, thus ended as an attack on any subjectivism that might
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stray into politics. Boundaries would have to be set. Liberal 
constitutionalism, in the words of phenomenologist Henry Kariel,
was designed to exclude from decision­
making arenas...the action of people who 
are impulsive, shiftless, and injudicious, 
who are not given to making calculations, 
who fail to see the present in the light of 
both a validated past and an extrapolated 
future. " H
This, then, is the theoretical context within which Public 
Opinion is situated. Lippmann argued that it is impossible for 
people to know the world as it truly is, because the process of 
knowing inevitably interferes. Based on this, he argued for a 
self-consciously "neutral" expertise, one which will "consciously 
provide a way of overcoming the subjectivism of human 
o p i n i o n . ..."12 This fits snugly within the liberal tradition, 
which typically aims to limit the subjective with "objective" 
restraints. Section I examined Lippmann's use of the "objective" 
restraint of the economy, Section II the moral restraint of 
natural law, and this section examines the restraint of governing 
elites. Before turning to Lippmann's attack on the irrationality 
and subjectivity of democracy, it is necessary to review the 
epistemology of Public Opinion.
B. Public Opinion and Knowledge
Although Walter Lippmann was influenced by his Harvard 
professor William James, it is misleading to consider him a
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student of James —  if by that one means a person devoted to the 
systematic elaboration, clarification or even criticism of a 
teacher. Lippmann frequently quoted James (particularly in his 
earlier work) and on several occasions formally acknowledged his 
debt to his mentor, but Lippmann's work does not consistently 
uphold the basics of James's pragmatic epistemology.
James held, in simplest terms, that the totality exists but 
the human intellect cannot grasp it. Lippmann raised no doubts 
about the first contention, regarding the ontological objectivity 
of nature. On the second contention, the limits of human 
rationality, Lippmann held two opposing viewpoints: As was 
established in Section II, the older Lippmann of The Public 
Philosophy believed that an "independent reality" exists, 
"objectively, not subjectively. It can be discovered. It has to 
be obeyed."13 The younger Lippmann, however, held the opposite 
point of view. Lippmann's general argument in Public Opinion was 
that humanity's problem in knowing the world is not a practical 
one, but one of principle: The knowing process always, 
necessarily determines that one knows a thing in a way that 
precludes knowing the thing as it is. As Lippmann's mentor James 
put it, all abstract ideas, scientific theories and 
interpretations of experience are simply manmade languages. They 
are ideas, to capsulize James's view, created by the intellect to 
lead us from an older form of experience to a newer one. It is 
the nature of the intellect to act as a unifying force. It grasps 
phenomena as they come into our lives and gives them coherent 
form. This coherence, however, should not be mistaken for
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anything more than a tiny, fleeting patch of manmade unity on an 
immense and tossing sea of r e a l i t y . -*-4
Lippmann's epistemology in Public Opinion ran a similar 
course: Man lives in a world "too big, too complex, and too 
fleeting for direct acquaintance. We are not equipped to deal 
with so much subtlety, so much variety, so many permutations and 
combinations." So humans reconstruct the world as "a simpler 
model."15 Man creates a counterfeit reality, one based upon "the 
casual fact, the creative imagination, the wiill to believe...."15 
Lippmann denounced the claim that human thought and perception 
naturally take the form of "facts" as a prejudice foisted upon 
the world by empiricists. There is no such thing as a pure fact, 
arising neatly in the mind; there is no such event as a direct 
and truthful connection between reality and human response.
Lippmann, therefore, went beyond a "realist" theory of 
knowledge. He did not hold that the sensations copy or 
objectively reflect reality. Reality does not determine thought 
in a direct, hard-and-fast manner. Instead, according to 
Lippmann, people create screening mechanisms, "pseudo­
environments" that run interference between them and the world. 
These pseudo-environments or "interior representations of the 
world, are a determining element in thought, feeling, and 
action."17 These "pictures inside people's heads do not 
automatically correspond with the world outside."1® When people 
act on the basis of these pictures, the result eventuates "in the 
real environment...."1® Sooner or later contradiction develops 
between the action based on the pseudo-environment and its effect
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in the real environment.
Then comes the sensation of butting one's 
head against a stone wall, of learning by 
experience, and witnessing Herbert 
Spencer's tragedy of the murder of a 
Beautiful Theory by a Gang of Brutal Facts, 
the discomfort in short of a 
maladjustment.20
In response, Lippmann argued, man adjusts to eliminate the
maladjustment. This adjustment takes place through the medium of
fictions.21 "By fictions I do not mean lies.... The range of
fictions extends all the way from complete hallucination to the
scientists' perfectly self-conscious use of a schematic
model...."22
This is a crucial and distinctive element of the young 
Lippmann1s epistemology. He claimed that people have to 
fictionalize about the environment because it is impossible to 
know it. People adjust their pseudo-environment in response to 
the real environment. The motion proceeds from maladjustment to 
adjustment, through the medium of fiction. This device is similar 
to the "problematic situation" of pragmatist John Dewey. One 
knows something when it "fits" or "works" with one's conception 
of oneself and the world.
Lippmann, therefore, set up an irreconcilable conflict 
between the subjective and the objective. He framed it, however, 
in a manner that slights the subjective and overplays the 
objective. Because he emphasized the necessity of continually 
adjusting the subjective pseudo-environment, Lippmann underplayed 
the fact that the environment, too, is ever-changing.
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"Existence," in the words of Santayana, "cannot be 
a r r e s t e d . ..."23 Moreover, Lippmann created a dialectic in which 
the subjective must always give way to the objective. There is no 
ideal, in the young Lippmann's view; there was nothing belonging 
to the inner world that was as significant, perpetual and as 
constant as the outer world. Lippmann erred grievously here, for 
it is not the real that endures. As Santayana wrote, "only the 
transmissible forms of things can endure, to match the 
transmissible faculties which living beings hand down to one 
another." It is the ideal which is "essentially eternal and 
capable of endless embodiments...."24
Lippmann emphasized an unchanged reality, a changed picture 
inside people's heads. In this view, even though there is a 
nearly endless arrangement of pictures possible inside the head, 
there is no freedom from reality. The innate nature of man is 
reduced to a transmission belt.
This line of criticism can be pursued right into the
ontological structure of the young Lippmann's world. A pseudo-
)environment, he wrote, is "a hybrid compounded of 'human nature' 
and conditions."25 This definition must be plumbed for all it 
contains, because —  at this point in his career —  Lippmann 
almost uniformly defined human nature as an inseparable blend of 
nature and nurture, inheritance and circumstance. He claimed 
nothing further about people's needs and potentialities.26 By 
implication, however, his definition of the pseudo-environment 
constitutes a definite claim about the content of human nature.
To develop this claim, one should first summarize the manner in
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which the pseudo-environment arises: Humans (a) view the world 
through their senses, (b) create mental images of the world, (c) 
act, in response to those images, and (d) adjust the images in 
response to their impression of the consequences of their 
actions. The key to this process could be called the "cognitive 
consciousness," a term opined by Ron Perrin. The cognitive 
consciousness adjusts and readjusts the pseudo-environment in 
response to conditions or images based on conditions. Lippmann 
described this faculty as an "innate disposition" whose "central 
part...retains its specific character and remains common to all 
individuals and situations in which the instinct is excited."27 
The cognitive consciousness, thus, was described by Lippmann as 
an innate, unchanging and universal aspect of humanity. This 
amounted to a potentially egalitarian statement on Lippmann1s 
part: Everyone possesses a cognitive consciousness. Lippmann did 
not specify, however, whether all cognitive consciousnesses are 
created equal. As is shown later in this section, he obviously 
did not believe all people are equal in this capacity, for —  
without explanation —  he suggested that some individuals were 
better able to reduce the discrepancies between the pseudo­
environment and the environment. Because of this difference in 
capacities, Lippmann recommended that "a machinery of knowledge" 
be built so that those already capable of forming reliable 
pictures of the environment would have special access to 
decision-makers.28
Beyond the existence of the cognitive consciousness, 
Lippmann made no further claims about the natural capacities,
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-needs or ends of human beings. One cannot say anything, he 
argued, "about what man is and always will be...or about what are 
the necessary conditions of society."2® Man may possess 
instinctual responses, such as fear, "but what he will fear and 
how he will try to escape, is determined not from birth but by 
e x p e r i e n c e . T o  discuss the ends of individuals, or of society, 
is to engage in useless pontification, Lippmann concluded.
The implications of this position are quietistic. Lippmann's 
human, as described above, existed within an externally confined 
being. Lippmann's ontology predisposed his politics against 
defining and realizing the good. What began as a relativistic and 
modern psychological theory was taken to conservative 
conclusions. Humans react and adjust, but they don't idealize and 
create a new world. Revealingly, when Lippmann reversed his 
position on ideals, arguing for objectively knowable natural law, 
he came to much the same quietistic conclusion: People must 
adhere to those higher values which can be objectively known, to 
fail to do so will bring maladjustment and chaos into the world.
C. The Irrationality of Democracy
In Lippmann's view, the threat of the subjective existed not 
in the authority of the executive but in the growing power of the 
masses. The march of democracy had, in his eyes, substituted the 
subjectivism of the multitude for that of the monarch.
Lippmann and others were alarmed, in the words of
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Lazarsfeld, because "people who did not belong to the ruling 
classes from which the government personnel was recruited" were 
demanding "a voice in public affairs."31 Lippmann's response to 
this democratic pressure was unequivocally negative. He declared 
it a "false ideal" which held that the voters are "inherently 
competent" to direct public a f f a i r s . 32 using the psychological 
argument outlined earlier in this section, he concluded that the 
traditional democratic theory of public opinion is flawed because 
it is based on "the intolerable and unworkable fiction that each 
of us must acquire a competent opinion about all public 
a f f a i r s . "33 only the mythical citizen of a mythical society could 
conform to the traditional theory, Lippmann argued; in reality, 
citizens possess not an insatiable appetite for self-government, 
but myriad desires, some trivial, some grand, some self-centered, 
some social.
The practical effect of the democratic theory of public 
opinion had been, Lippmann argued, to expand the influence of the 
irrational. Democracy created a power in the state, he 
maintained, that could impose the irrational upon society. In an 
earlier book, he used the example of William Jennings Bryan's 
campaign for the Presidency. Bryan, he argued, attempted to use 
mass democracy to preserve a defunct form of economic 
organization.34 The agrarian populists of the nineteenth century, 
whose preeminent spokesman was Bryan, fought against historical 
necesity, according to Lippmann. The modern, industrialized 
economy would inevitably destroy their pastoral order, Lippmann 
predicted. The populists acted irrationally and arbitrarily when
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they tried to stop the restructuring of their way of life, he 
argued. It was irrational of the farmers to believe their desire 
to preserve their way of life had more weight with history than 
the inexorable shift of labor to the industrial and urban 
centers. Lippmann did not argue that the modern economy is 
inherently reasonable or necessarily just. In fact, he went out 
of his way to dramatize the trauma and destruction and injustice 
that have accompanied the evolution of capitalism. However, as 
was shown in Section I, he regarded the division of labor and the 
extension of markets as historical necessities. To try to stop 
them or to alter their inexorable progress amounts to bashing 
one's head against the wall —  and that is irrational.
As Lippmann grew older, he stuck by only the conclusion of 
his argument in Public Opinion: He continued to insist that the 
democratic method was unworkable, but he no longer argued from a 
relativistic point of view. In The Public Philosophy, as was made 
clear in Section II, he based his political argument upon the 
objective existence of natural law. His description of the 
shortcomings of the masses, however, had not changed at all. He
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maintained: (1) The masses "cannot be counted upon to apprehend
regularly and promptly the reality of t h i n g s . "35 (2) For the 
masses to understand it, an issue cannot be told in its true 
complexity and necessary detail; instead it must be simplified 
and thus grievously distorted. (3) When the masses give their 
opinions as voters, the most they can say is "yes" or "no."
Whether Lippmann viewed democracy'from his youthful, 
relativistic perspective, or from his mature, absolutist 
perspective, he saw the same problem; The democratic method 
distorts and crudely oversimplifies the information available to 
decisionmakers? because of this, the democratic method is capable 
of only elementary and childish opinions. "Where mass opinion 
dominates the government there is a morbid derangement of the 
true functions of power. The derangement brings about the 
enfeeblement, verging on paralysis, of the capacity to g o v e r n . "36
In Public Opinion Lippmann proposed to solve this dilemma 
through the creation of "an independent, expert organization for 
making the unseen facts intelligible to those who have to make 
the d e c i s i o n s ."37 in The Public Philosophy Lippmann called for a 
radically stronger executive: "A mass cannot govern...."38 it is
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the executive which is "the active power in the s t a t e . "39 In 
both situations he suggested the transfer of authority to an 
elite. The common characteristic of the elite of Public Opinion 
and the elite of The Public Philosophy was an ability to perceive 
the necessities of circumstance and a willingness to adjust to 
them. The elite exercised the same relationship to the masses and 
their desires as it exercised to its own desires:pThe elite was 
to deny its immediate desires, to seek beyond the immediately 
seen, to base its decisions upon a larger sense of reality. This 
capacity, the distinguishing characteristic of Lippmann's elite, 
was possessed by very few. On why these few possess this 
characteristic, Lippmann was silentTj The only reasonable 
explanation :—  particularly within the context of Public Opinion 
—  is that s.ome variable (s) in the environment enabled the elite 
to better grasp the nature of reality. Lippmann treated this 
cognitive enrichment of the few (and impoverishment of the many) 
as a circumstance of nature, similar to the widening of the 
market and the increasing division of labor. He did not pursue 
the extent to which the general public's understanding could be 
improved by altering some aspect of the environment. Instead, he 
went the other direction. Lippmann institutionalized the existing 
hierarchical distribution of cognitive ability, of knowledge and 
of power. He took elitist institutions to be natural, and he 
built theories which —  if followed —  would make elitism 
inevitable.
Thus, when examined from the perspective of a popular 
democrat, Lippmann is vulnerable to a devastating attack.
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Lippmann can be denounced for his repeated attempts to frighten 
the United States away from the substantive fulfillment of 
political equality. The task of Lippmann's elite was not tutelage 
of the masses in self-realization; its goal was not to elevate 
more people to its level of philosophical self-awareness. Its 
message was self-denial —  the acceptance of one's position. The 
task of his elite was to stem the onrush of the masses, to push 
back the democratic urge which had welled up from below. Those 
"insiders" with superior cognitive abilities are entitled, in 
Lippmann's view, to help exercise authority in the name of the 
general interest. They are qualified to be among those who 
balance the interests of society from above.
What, however, of an arrangement which does not accept 
hierarchy as necessary. Is it possible? It is true, as Lippmann 
contended, that a complex, technological society necessarily 
requires individuals with extremely specialized abilities and 
knowledge. Nonetheless, individuals do not have to be riveted to 
particular abilities or skills. The social fixation of an 
individual according to his or her particular function is not 
necessary for increased economic productivity, why should it be 
necessary for political efficacy? The division of tasks can be 
handled in other ways, such as taking turns. Decision-making 
authority can be distributed in other ways, by lottery or 
rotation.40
• Lippmann asserts that specialization necessarily requires
hierarchical authority. That, however, is Lippmann's preference.
* ?
Those who have certain specialties do not necessarily require or
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deserve more power over the non-specialists. In those situations 
where delegation of authority is necessary, and there admittedly 
are some, then. Lippmann's suggestion that those who exercise 
authority should be advised by experts has certain merits, as 
does his later suggestion that those who exercise authority 
should adhere to society’s highest values. By this point, 
however, one must seriously question Lippmann's justification for 
these experts and moral stalwarts. His only consistent argument 
on their behalf is that they check the authoriy of the masses.
D. The Mechanism of Control
How Lippmann's elite was to prove the truth of its knowledge 
and thus earn its special status was a simple procedure —  in 
theory. Since the elite's knowledge better fit its time and 
circumstance than the knowledge of the masses, the elite's 
decisions "work" better in the given environment.
Lippmann, however, was not disingenuous about how 
problematic this theory was in practice. He acknowledged, for 
instance, that consent to the elite or to any authority can be 
manufactured and based on deception, as well- as earned and based 
on truth. Psychological research and modern media, Lippmann 
observed, have caused a "revolution" in the practice of 
democracy: They have made it possible for experts to create or 
manipulate public opinion. This change Lippmann called 
"infinitely more significant than any shifting of economic
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power."41 Revealingly, he did not denounce the manufacture of 
opinion as a dangerous development. "Within the life of the 
generation now [1922] in control of affairs, persuasion has 
become a self-conscious art and a regular organ of popular 
government."42i He regarded this as only one more factor in the 
equation of modern 'politics, one more reason why it was no longer 
possible "to believe in the original dogma of democracy; that the 
knowledge for the management of human affairs comes up 
spontaneously from the human heart."43 Lippmann did not openly 
encourage the manipulation of public opinion; in fact, he implied 
that the manufacture of opinion was one of the causes of the 
decline of democracy. However, neither did he condemn it as a 
tool.
' This leaves unanswered, however, the question of the 
content of public opinion: Is public opinion merely the aggregate 
of a multitude of pseudo-environments? How does the public come 
to agree upon a working definition of reality? Lippmann1s answer 
to this question involved a mechanism he called the "stereotype." 
Although Steel passed lightly over the subject, it is an 
explosive concept, probably the most controversial idea in Public 
Opinion. In startlingly realistic language, Lippmann defined a 
stereotype as the dominant ideology —  although he never resorted 
to the term "ideology."
Stereotypes, he said, are the "most pervasive of all 
influences" on the way one sees the world.44 They are the 
preconceptions that, "unless education has made us acutely aware, 
govern deeply the whole process of perception."4  ̂ Some people's
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perceptions are governed entirely by stereotypes. Others "know 
they are only stere.otypes" and "hold them lightly" and "modify 
them gladly."46 Stereotypes "may not be a complete picture of the 
world," but they are a "more or less consistent picture...to 
which our habits, our tastes, our capacities, our comforts and 
our hopes have adjusted themselves." "A pattern of stereotypes is 
not neutral."47 The "perfect stereotype" is Aristotle's argument 
that there are humans who are slaves by nature. Aristotle's 
argument is logically "worthless."4  ̂ it is simply the slave 
holder's stereotype imposed upon reality.
Each slave holder was to look upon his chattels as natural slaves. When his eye 
had been trained to see them that way, he 
was to note as confirmation of their 
servile character the fact that they 
performed servile work, that they were 
competent to do servile work, and that they 
had the muscles to do servile work.4^
Aristotle could not see through this stereotype because it
"imposes a certain character on the data" of his senses, before
the data reaches his intelligence.50 other examples of
stereotypes include "the American version of progress" which
transformed "an unusual amount of pugnacity, acquisitiveness, and
lust of power into productive work." This civilization-building
ethic "has been a success so nearly perfect in the sequence of
ideals, practice, and results, that any challenge to it is called
u n - A m e r ic a n .51 BUt the American stereotype of progress was "a
very partial and inadequate way of representing the world.
With the stereotype of 'progress' before
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their eyes, Americans have in the mass seen 
little that did not accord with that 
progress. They saw the expansion of cities , 
but not the accretion of slums; they 
cheered the census statistics, but refused 
to consider overcrowding; they pointed 
with pride to their growth, but would not 
see the drift from the land, or the 
unassimilated immigration. They expanded 
industry furiously at reckless cost to 
their natural resources; they built up 
gigantic corporations without arranging 
for industrial relations.52
Stereotypes, for all their blind spots, are a necessity, for —
among other reasons —  they are "a defense of our position in
society," and they tend "to preserve us from all the bewildering
effect of trying to see the world steadily and see it whole."53
Stereotypes can be modified when experience contradicts them.
However, if a person "is no longer plastic, or if some powerful
interest makes it highly inconvenient to rearrange his
stereotypes," the contradiction will be forgotten or otherwise
put aside (or perhaps the person will become cynical).54
Lippmann's concept of a stereotype is so incisive that it
provides a tool to critique his work, as well as the work of
others. Lippmann stated that stereotypes are not logical and that
reasonable people can see through them and modify them. (One can
also assume that there would be times when it would not be in the
interest of reasonable people to modify the existing
stereotypes.) Although Lippmann implied that the reasonable elite
can see things as they are, that would be inconsistent with his
general epistemology (putting aside its internal contradictions).
So when seeing things reasonably, the elite is actually only
seeing things differently —  that is, according to a different
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set of stereotypes. Interpreted in this light, the elite's 
"rationality" evaporates. Lippmann attacked democracy because it 
elevates the subjectivism of the masses, but then he embraced an 
oligarchical arrangement which elevates the subjectivism of the 
elite.55
Those who Lippmann described as holding stereotypes lightly 
and as being capable of modifying stereotypes could be considered 
the official (and unofficial) ideologists. Lippmann implied that 
these individuals don't necessarily believe the truth of the new 
stereotypes they create; it is easy to imagine them as paid 
purveyors of propaganda.
The transmission mechanism between those who modify 
stereotypes and the mass of people was not specified by Lippmann. 
The implication in places, specifically the reference to the all­
pervasiveness of stereotypes, was that people either voluntarily 
or unknowingly consent to stereotypes. The art of persuasion 
obviously played a role here. The reference to a "powerful 
interest" that "makes it highly inconvenient" for people to 
change their stereotypes presents the totalitarian possibility. 
This powerful interest could easily be seen as one which attempts 
to control the dissemination of stereotypes, approving some, 
rejecting others. Lippmann connected stereotypes, through 
examples, to economic progress and military power. The 
implication was, again, that the prevailing stereotypes are those 
that reinforce not simply the position of every member of society 
but first and foremost the position of the most powerful members.
"The management of affairs," Lippmann wrote during the
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1920s, "tends once again to rest in a governing class, a class 
which is not hereditary, which is without titles, but is none the 
less obeyed and f o l l o w e d . "56 Lippmann's theory of public opinion 
explained why he thought this was necessary. His theory of 
stereotypes and his acceptance of the manufacture of consent show 
how he thought it could be done.
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CONCLUSION
Life may be full, blessed with love and brilliance and 
strength, but death is a simple, unceremonial thing. A birth is 
glorious, an awakening, a cementing of bonds between male and 
female, between parent and child; a birth gives meaning to the 
present and reaffirms the existence of the future. The dead give 
us the past —  tangible in the corpse and its possessions, 
ethereal in the substance of our memories (sometimes more elusive 
than we desire, sometimes more pronounced and vigorous than the 
moment from which they spring, sometimes more satisfying and 
sensual than the present). All this seems simple enough, well 
worn by the words of tens of thousands of writers. What is more 
difficult, less worn perhaps, is the relation between the dead 
and the future.
When Walter Lippmann was about to die, he asked Louis 
Auchincloss, who had come to his bedside, if his last will and 
testament was in order. "Nothing more" was on Lippmann's mind, 
according to Ronald Steel. "No complaints, no fears, no regrets. 
Never did he speak of prayer, or of God, or of an afterlife."!
There was courage and realism and consistency in Lippmann's 
request of Auchincloss. Lippmann was concerned with his bequest 
to the living, not with ruminations about the soul or 
immortality. Lippmann's last will and testament was, obviously, a 
statement about the relations between the dead and the future.
The possessions of the dead can comfort, divide, placate, wound
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or inspire the living. In this respect, Lippmann dealt with the 
con
sequences of his death in a very American way. He set in order 
the property which, according to law, was his to have and
control.
What, however, of that part of him which was never his to 
own or control? What of the political testament of Walter 
Lippmann? What of the enduring substance of his work? As a 
political philosopher, Lippmann worked with the common property 
of humanity —  its language and ideals. As an humanist, he spent 
his life immersed in the universal aspects of humanity —  its 
emotions and needs, both animal and sublime. All these are —  
even more than private property —  things granted to individuals 
not for private purposes but for the common social purpose. They 
are inherited through books and upbringing and a social form of 
intuition. They are passed on through private lives, through 
public actions and utterances.
The political testament of Walter Lippmann, then, is a 
product of the American tradition of political philosophy. The 
major problems in the political philosophy of Walter Lippmann are 
not the unique difficulties of an individual thinker; they are a 
reflection of deep-seated tensions within the American tradition.- 
,This thesis identified three major tensions within this 
tradition. First, standards are not set solely by either the 
material or ideal realm. Instead, the two realms are continually 
related and an always changing equilibrium struck between them. 
Second, modernity (which could be summarized as liberalism, 
capitalism and the scientific outlook) is a double-edged sword.
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It provides and protects, while it simultaneously corrodes and 
alienates. Modernity makes a nation wealthy and powerful, but 
corrupts its citizenry with expediency, opportunism and drift.
The modern citizen customarily adopts a non-teleological view of 
the universe but clings to a muted teleological view of human 
existence. Third, There is no settled view of human nature, of 
the needs and desires of humanity. Human nature is at one point 
regarded as innately opposed to civil order, while at another it 
is the very foundation of the highest forms of civility. The 
acquisitive, self-interested and domineering individual is lauded 
in one setting but condemned in another.
These, in short, are the problems identified by Walter 
Lippmann. This is the enduring testament he left to the future 
when he died in 1974. As this thesis made clear, he left these 
issues far from resolved. For that reason, Lippmann remains 
important to theorists today. He guides political thinkers to 
fundamental tensions in American political philosophy. From 
there, however, work must begin anew, for beyond that point, 
Lippmann's guidance begins to fail.
As has been shown, Lippmann approached these issues with a 
foregone preference for the existing order. The mature Lippmann 
consistently resisted change that was not founded upon current 
circumstances and their direct needs. He was, by and large, what 
this thesis has described as a conservative determinist, a 
theorist who desired the present to be securely bound to the 
past. Standing against idealists and radicals, he assigned 
primacy to the past, rather than the future. He preferred
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hierarchy and stability to equality and change. Although he 
invoked the ideal in his defense of order, his guiding light was 
always close to the ground, a part of the status quo.
Lippmann denied the future and clung too closely to the 
present. On what the future held, he would not speculate, nor did 
he dwell on its role in the present: "Never did he speak of 
prayer, or of God, or of an afterlife." Lippmann may have claimed 
to see an open future, but he inevitably filled it with the 
present.
Lippmann's search, in the end, was not for the future, nor 
was it for meaning or for purpose. Lippmann was looking for 
authority. The unresolved tensions of American political 
philosophy were, for him, not simply questions in need of answers 
but the burning call for an authority that could resolve any 
disruption caused by those tensions. Lippmann was concerned with 
how the fundamental questions were answered, of course, but the 
contradictions in his responses demonstrate that the substance of 
the answers was largely secondary to him. Paramount to Lippmann 
was the preservation of authority. Not any authority, but 
authority vested in the hands of those who are pledged to be 
gentle with the status quo.
To carry forward Lippmann's work is a worthy endeavor. To do 
so, one should begin with his questions, not his answers, for his 
answers cling too closely to the past, whereas his questions 
harken to the future.
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Books by Lippmann are cited in abbreviated form. The full 
citation is given here.
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DM
PO
PM
GS
MF
PP
A Preface to Politics. New York: Mitchel Kennerley, 
1913.
Drift and Mastery. New York: Mitchell Kennerley, 1914.
Public Opinion. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1922.
A Preface to Morals. New York: Macmillan, 1929.
An Inquiry into the Principles of the Good Society. 
Boston: Little, Brown, 1937.
The Method of Freedom. New York: Macmillian, 1934.
Essays in the Public Philosophy. Boston: Little,
Brown, 1955.
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FOOTNOTES
Introduction
1 Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century.
Boston: Atlantic-Little, Brown Books, 1980, p. 324. Steel's 
book is an eminently readable, entertaining account of
Lippmann's life. It is thrilling, particularly if one is 
thrilled by the interplay of real-life politics, famous 
personalities and the intellect (broadly defined). It is a 
reasonably thorough introduction to Lippmann's voluminous
works. However, alas, it is very modest in its analysis and
disappointing in its lack of sustained criticism of Lippmann's 
theoretical work.
Criticisms of Steel's book aside, this thesis would never 
have been started nor completed had it not been for the 
inspiration of Walter Lippmann and the American Century.
2 Steel, 493.
2 Steel, 324.
4 Steel, 490.
5 Steel, 490.
6 Clinton Rossiter and James Lare, editors, The Essential Lippmann. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982. p. xii.
7 Steel, 77.
8 PO, 69.
9 Steel, 496.
10 PP, 86.
11 GS, 342-3.
12 George Santayana, The Life of Reason, Vol. 2. New York: 
Scribner's, 1954, p. 9.
Section I
1 Lewis Mumford, "Mr. Lippmann's Heresy Hunt," New Republic, 
September 29, 1937, quoted in Steel, p. 325.
2 John Dewey, "Liberalism in a Vacuum," Common Sense, December 
1937, quoted in Steel, p. 325.
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3 Steel, 322.
4 Oskar Lange showed Lippmann to be wrong in theory. The 
Yugoslav state has shown, to an extent, him to be wrong in 
practice.
To criticize the New Deal as collectivist and 
totalitarian is doubly confusing when viewed in the light of 
Lippmann's argument in The Method of Freedom (1934). That 
little book is a popularized version of certain views of 
Lippmann's friend, John Maynard Keynes. It calls for the 
government "to raise taxes and reduce its debts in good times 
and to lower taxes and borrow in bad times, to curtail public 
works, which means its demand for labor and materials, when 
private employment is full, and to promote public works when 
private work is slack." An "ideal" system of taxation," wrote 
Lippmann, would "be discriminating as to encourage or 
discourage saving with a view to preserving the equlibrium 
between saving and investment." (MF, 53-54.)
To some that might sound like, if not economic planning, 
serious government -intervention in the economy. Lippmann, 
however, tried to present it in a very different light. He 
described the Keynesian measures as adjustments made, "not to 
impose a social order conceived by officials," but to maintain 
the existing but evolving order. (MF, 59) He held in Method of 
Freedom, "Not only is it impossible to control the rhythm of 
capitalism by regulating laws but the very attempt to do it is 
as likely as not to accentuate the violence of the
maladjustment." The distinction he draws is both one of means 
(the New Deal is totalitarian because it uses administrative 
fiat) and of ends (the New Deal is totalitarian because it 
to adjust the basis of the economy). The correct means, in
Lippmann's opinion, is the common law and the judicial system
or an administrative procedure that adheres to similar 
principles; the correct end is to adjust society to the basics 
of the economy.
The cause of the Depression, Lippmann argued, was the 
irrational masses; the solution was the rational overseer. "In 
substance, the state undertakes to counteract the mass errors 
of the individualist crowd by doing the opposite of what the 
crowd is doing; it saves when the crowd is spending too much; 
it borrows when the crowd is saving too much.... Its ideal is
to prevent excess." (MF, 59)
5 Steel, p. 323.
6 The Good Society., quoted in Steel, p. 322.
1 GS, 205.
8 Steel, p. 323.
9 Steel, p. 323.
18 Steel, p. 326. Steel's explanation of totalitarianism is not
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developed. The glimpses of it that pass by, however, 
remind one of those theorists who believe that the 
totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century were 
caused and governed not by an elite but by the masses.
11 PM, 226.
12z GS, 234.
13 Steel, p. 323.
14 Steel, p. 323.
MF, 49. As will be shown later in this section, Lippmann 
believed the "increasing complexity of the economic order" 
is, on the balance, a favorable development. He nowhere 
tried to sort out the contradiction between this position, 
which said that the economy naturally produces herdlike 
behavior, and his Keynesian position, which said the 
state must intervene to save the economy, which was 
threatened by the herdlike behavior of the masses. He 
was, in effect, saving that which he said caused the 
problem.
16 MF, 23-24.
17 DM, 141.
18 DM, 138.
193 GS, 204.
20 The proposals of guild socialist G.D.H. Cole were quoted 
extensively and subjected to serious criticism in Chapter 
19 of Public Opinion. The Communist Manifesto was the 
only piece of writing by Marx and Engels to show up in
any more than cursory form..
21 PtP, 237.
22 Steel, p. 23. Steel's remark in its entirety indicated 
that he, too, has a rather narrow interpretation of
Marx.: "He (Lippmann} read The communist Manifesto and some
>: of Karl Marx's shorter essays, but disliked the emphasis 
on class struggle and felt that inciting the masses to
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mob action was not a desirable way to bring about a 
better society. Like most children of the Progressive 
era, he wanted to make society more equitable, not 
turn it upside down." (Once again, the imagery of.the 
masses as ah easily led herd of children flows so readily 
from Steel's pen that one senses more than a slight 
affinity with Lippmann's elitism.)
23 PtP, 239.
24 PtP, 240. That Marx's dialectic was "singleminded" is 
about the last observation any serious reader would make,
The claim is contradicted by both the dialectic's internal 
working and by the immense range of subject matter to 
which it was applied by Marx and Engels (not to mention 
the current growth industry of academics following in 
their footsteps).
One further note about this quotation: Lippmann's
concern for the average person was unusual, not simply 
because it was rare for him to voice such a thought (the 
average person is more frequently subsumed within the 
masses, a threat to stability),but also because it perhaps 
reveals a personal side of Lippmann's fear of mass 
society. In acknowledging the pain and aimlessness 
that is part of life for the forgotten multitudes,
Lippmann implied, that he would drive himself hard to 
avoid that despairing existence.
25 PtP, 241.
26 PtP, 242. This was written in'"1913, before Lenin and the 
Bolsheviks had to confront this problem. Some of Marx's 
thoughts on the proletarian revolution and that which 
follows it are found in Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts 
of 1844, which were not published in full until 1932. 
Lippmann, at any rate, would neither have read them nor 
cared what they said. After the October Revolution,
Marx stood or fell, as far as Lippmann was concerned, 
by the successes or failures of the Communist Party,
USSR.
After the Bolshevik Revolution, Lippmann wrote:
“Lenin completely abandoned the materialistic interpretation 
of politics. Had he held sincerely to the Marxian 
formula when he seized power in 1917, he would have said 
to himself: according to the teachings of Marx, socialism 
will develop out of a mature capitalism...here am I, in 
control of a nation that is only entering upon a capitalist 
development...it follows that for the present all idea 
of a socialist republic is out of the question...we must 
advance capitalism in order that the evolution which 
Marx predicted may take place. But Lenin did nothing of 
the sort. Instead of waiting for evolution to evolve, 
he tried by will, force, arid education, to defy the
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historical process which his philosophy assumed."
(P0f 119)
Lenin, interestingly, from 1894 to almost the 
date of the Revolution, did believe that the role of 
the proletariat was to help the bourgeoisie overthrow 
the Tsar and establish a democracy. As late as April 
1917 the Bolsheviks believed themselves to be in the 
middle of a bourgeois revolution. At that point,
Lenin declared that Russia had passed from the first 
stage of the revolution, which placed power in the 
hands of the bourgeoisie, to the second stage, "which 
must place power in the hands of the proletariat and 
the poorest sections of the peasants." (V. Lenin,
"The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution," 
quoted in David McLellan, Marxism After Marx. New York: 
Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1979, pp. 93-94.)
27 PO, 116.
28 PO, 118.
29 PO, 119.
Putting aside Lippmann's intentionally truncated reading 
of Marx's "economic determinism," it must be pointed out 
that the tide of opinion among western Marxists has 
moved away from the "hard" determinism of the Second 
International, a view which did indeed claim that the 
transformation of the forces of production would transform 
all social relations. There would be a certain amount 
of plausibility to the argument that Lippmann responded 
primarily to this rather mechanistic Marxism.
However, it is clear that Marx and Engels themselves 
did not argue that noneconomic phenomena are uniquely 
determined by the economic order. Engels, for instance, 
tried specifically to guard against this oversimplification 
of their views: "According to the materialist conception
of history, the ultimately determining element in history 
is the production and reproduction of real life. More 
than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. Hence 
if somebody twists this into saying that the economic 
element is the only determining one, he transforms that 
proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless 
phrase. The economic situation is the basis, but the 
various elements of the superstructure: political forms 
of the class struggle and its results, to wit: constitutions 
established by the victorious class after a successful 
battle, etc., juridical forms, and then even the reflexes 
of all thesje actual struggles in the brains of the
participants, political, juristic, philosophical theories,
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religious views and their further development into systems 
of dogmas, also exercise their influence upon the course 
of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate 
in determining their form. There is an interaction of 
all these elements in whic, amid all the endless host of 
accidents (that is, of things and events, whose inner 
connection is so remote or so impossible of proof that 
we can regard it as non-existent, as negligible) the 
economic movement finally asserts itself as necessary." 
(Engels, "Letters on Historical Materialism," in The 
Marx-Engels Reader, Second Edition, edited by Robert C.
Tucker. Hew York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1978,
p. 760.)
Lenin, after his lengthy study of Hegel, strove to 
refute simple materialism. "Man's consciousness," he 
said at one point, "not only reflects the objective world 
but creates it." (Lenin, Philosophical Notebooks, 
quoted in McLellan, p. 108.)
Gramsci wrote that economic events "simply create 
a terrain more favourable to the dissemination of certain 
modes of thought, and certain ways of resolving questions 
involving the entire subsequent development of national 
life." (Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison 
Notebooks, quoted in McLellan, p. 187.)
31 PO, 119. Contrary to Lippmann's hyperbolic assertion,
Marx never said that economic position supplies a class 
with "a coherent policy" for obtaining its interests.
Instead, Marx introduced several concepts to explain -why 
true class consciousness does not suddenly appear 
imprinted on the inside of one's forehead. Consciousness 
always grows in a dialectical relationship with the 
material. Instead of being a one-sidedly favorable 
relationship, it also produces obstructions to class 
consciousness, such as the fetishism of commodities 
(a concept which shows how capitalist commodity production 
makes direct social relations between individuals appear 
to be social relations between things.
Much of 20th century Marxism, most notably the work 
of Lukacs, Gramsci and the critical theorists, has 
delved into the difference between the actual 
consciousness of the proletariat and the consciousness 
it would have if it were fully aware of its own 
interests. The praxis of these thinkers and others 
has concentrated on making individuals within the 
working class subjectively conscious of their role in history.
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
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PO, 119. Again, contrary to Lippmann's assertion that Marx 
posited each member of a class with an identical conception of 
the class interest, Engels wrote, "For what each individual 
wills is obstructed by everyone else, and what emerges is 
something that no one willed." (Engels, "Letters on Historical 
Materialism," in Tucker, p. 761.)
PO, 118.
PO, 118, 117.
PO, 121.
PO, 120.
MF, 6.
DM, 109.
PtP, 317.
MF, 113.
GS, 117.
GS, 205. Lippmann, eschewed rigorous definition of key terms 
and instead simply repeated them until they rang with 
familiarity.
GS, 168. Lippmann never claimed that the world market went 
peacefully into the lives of the underdeveloped nations of the 
world. He thought that it was usually established by blood 
and force. Once in place, however, the market brings 
civilization to the heathens (and eventually the imperialists 
wither away). Marx, too, thought that the subjugation of 
lesser developed societies would eliminate their backward 
aspects, but he also remained critical of the globalization 
of markets: "In history up to the present it is certainly an 
empirical fact that separate individuals have, with the 
broadening of their activity into world-historical activity, 
become more and more enslaved under a power alien to them...a 
power which has become more and more enormous and, in the last 
instance, turns out to be the world market." (Marx, The 
German Ideology, in Tucker, pp. 163-164.)
GS, 205. Marx, too, held the division of labor to be a 
crucial category, although unlike Lippmann he saw it 
developing dialectically. The division of labor, Marx wrote, 
"implies the fact that intellectual and material activity —  
enjoyment ad labour, production and consumption —  devolve on 
different individuals, and that the only possibility of their 
not coming into contradiction lies in the negation in its turn 
of the division of labour....
"With the division of labour, in which all these
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contradictions are implicit... is given simultaneously the 
distribution, and indeed the unequal distribution, both 
quantitative and qualitative, of labour and its products, 
hence property....
"Further, the division of labour implies the 
contradiction between the interest of the separate individual 
or the individual family and the communal interest of all 
individuals who have intercourse with one another.... And 
finally, the division of labour offers us the first example of 
how, as long as man remains in na'tural society, that is, as 
long as a cleavage exists between the particular and the 
common interest, as long, therefore, as activity is not 
voluntarily, but naturally, divided man's own deed becomes an 
alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of 
being controlled by him. For as soon as the distribution of
labour comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive 
sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which 
he cannot escape. He is a hunte, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a 
critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to 
lose his means of livelihood.... This fixation of social
activity, this consolidation of what we ourselves produce into 
an objective power above us, growing out of our control, 
thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our 
calculations, is one of the chief factors in historical 
development up till now." (Marx, The German Ideology, in 
Tucker, pp. 159-160.)
Marx developed the relationship between property-owner 
and propertyless as the fundamental antagonism within the 
capitalist division of labor. Lippmann, in contrast, found no 
inherent antagonisms within the division of labor. Lippmann 
also ignored the harmful effects of the "fixation" of 
individuals to a particular function in the division of labor. 
This imprisonment of individuals within a certain production 
niche is, as John McMurtry argues, not necessary for the 
increased productivity of labor. The technological necessity 
of the division of tasks (the need "to position labor-power x 
in place y for t.....tn") can be fulfilled in other ways,
"such as taking turns...." The "riveting" of a particular
person to one job "for all of t1 tn" is "a function of
the economic structure," not of technology, and can be 
eliminated, once capitalist economic organization is left 
behind. (John McMurtry, The Structure of Marx's World-View. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978, p. 69, 80.)
45 GS, 166.
46 GS, 212.
47 GS, 168.
48 GS, 207..
49 GS, 357.
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50 GS, 207.
51 GS, 204.
52 GS, 207.
53 MF, 23-24.
54 MF, 90.
55 MF, 105.
56 MF, 95.
57 MF, 96-97.
58 ^p, 99-100. Lippmann's argument here completely contradicts 
Steel's assertion that the mature Lippmann ignored "the 
central question of economic.power." (Steel, p. 3 24.)
Lippmann repeatedly stressed that his attack was aimed at 
excessive plutocratic "power" and proletarian instability.
He stated that "the inordinate accumulation of property means 
an inordinate accumulation of power," and refers to the 
plutocracy as "those who have more income than they need for 
their personal use and enjoyment." Their wealth is used as "an 
instrument of power exercised generally for the accumulation 
of more wealth and more power." (MF, 96.)
It was, in fact, Steel who ignored something.—  the- depth 
of Lippmann's commitment to the economic analysis of society.
59 GS, 40.
60 This final argument of Lippmann's closely paralleled the
more deterministic Marx. "Men never relinquish the social form
in which they have acquired certain productive forces. On the 
contrary, in order that they not be deprived of the result 
attained, and forfeit the fruits of civilization, they are 
obliged from the moment when the form of their commerce no 
longer corresponds to the productive forces acquired, to
change all their traditional social forms." (Marx, "Letter to
Annenkov," in McMurtry, p. 206.) McMurtry interpreted Marx to 
say that "the development of productive forces always holds or 
advances, and never regresses." (McMurtry, p. 232.)
Marx, of course, at times believed —  in Lippmann's terms 
—  that the time had come when the existing social order could
no longer adapt itself to the economy.
61 GS, 205.
62 GS, 209. This change in technology will be realized in one 
of two fashions: (1) Through a "revolutionary advance in the
logical powers of men" which makes possible "a planned society 
consciously directed." (GS, 34,33.) (2) Through a
revolutionary series of inventions which enable men "by their
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own self-sufficient effort to achieve a more satisfactory 
standard of life than they now aspire to." Lippmann suggested 
two possibilities: (a) "a machine that would with a little 
muscular energy produce food, clothes, shelter, comfrots, and 
luxuries out of any soil and a little sunshine;" or (b) "a 
medicine which would make men cease to want the diversified 
products of modern industry." (GS, 209.)
As impoverished as this view of the future may be, it 
bears further examination. Lippmann claimed that mankind 
arose in a "meagre and self-sufficing existence," passed 
through a stage o increasing interdependence and diminishing 
necessity (the present), and eventually will enter the future. 
The possibilities he offered for what lies in wait are totally 
contradictoy. The first possibility is a "consciously
directed," hence, interdependent and- (it is reasonable to
assume) somewhat centralized society that (he implied) is at 
least as materially productive as the present. The second 
possibility is a society that lies in the opposite direction. 
Within it, people live independent, self-sufficient lives, not 
consciously directed, interdependent or centralized. The 
standard of living in this society would be superior to that
of the present. The sub-possibilities within this arrangement
are, again, totally contradictory: The first is that men would 
be able to satisfy all their desires with a minimum of labor, 
and, thus, the standard of living improves. The second is that 
men, with the help of a potion, learn to control their 
desires, thus, the standard of living falls, but no one 
notices the difference. These two sub-possibilities are 
familiar categories within Lippmann's world view. They may be 
regarded as little more than the good/bad view of human 
nature, projected onto a technological background. In the
first sub-possibility, human nature is regarded as essentially
good and hence allowed to fulfill its desires; in the second, 
it is bad and hence must be restrained. The second view, most 
assuredly, is that of the mature Lippmann. The bad, irrational 
side of man must be denied. The question, always, is how and 
by whom?
63 GS, 168.
64 GS, 209. Lippmann, like John Stuart Mill, held the
distribution of income to be unrelated to the mode of
production. It could and should be altered. However, Lippmann 
was not particularly clear about the standard to which it 
should conform.
GS,232. Since Lippmann absolved the economy from any claim 
to justice or rationality, the appearance of irrationality or 
injustice is only a problem in people's minds. However, even 
though such opinions are false —  since they do not agree with 
"objective" reality —  they are troubling in Lippmann's view 
of things. If the wrong opinion is held by enough peopl, and 
if those people act upon their opinion (through a democratic 
government, for example), then that false opinion can change
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reality. (Even though reality would eventually destroy 
itself.)
66 GS, 207.
67 GS, 209.
68 GS, 362-363.
88 GS, 358. It should become increasingly apparent that
Lippmann's interpretation of the essential elements of modern 
capitalism was far from the views held by neoclassical 
economists. For example, "necessitous bargaining," which 
Lippmann included among "extrinsic and artificial causes of 
inequality, would be considered an intrinsic aspect of the 
economy by the neoclassicals and one which, when incorporated 
under "voluntary exchange," leads to gains for both parties.
Necessitous bargaining (and indeed much of the division 
of labor) refers to the advantage wielded by the capitalist 
over the laborer; for the capitalist may allow the passage of 
time (and the recurrence of business slumps) to exhaust the 
worker's resources, forcing the worker to agree to a 
"necessitous bargain."
Lippmann never endorsed competition, the sine qua non of 
orthodox economics. In his early works he even argued that the 
competitive ideal is retrogressive. In The Good Society he 
ignored the matter.
70 DM, 143.
71 GS, 230.
72 GS, 227.
73 GS, 174.
Section II
1 Alf Ross, quoted in Paul E. Sigmund, Natural Law in 
Political Thought. Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1971', 
p. 205.
2 PP, 135.
3 Sigmund, 205-207.
4 GS, 169-170, 347; PP, 106.
5 PP, 124.
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6 PP, 174--175.
7 GS, 378.
8 GS, 247;! PP, 101.
9 PP, 179--180.
10 GS, 337--338.
11 PP, 174--175.
12 GS, 347--348.
13 classical natural law principles are established by the 
natural order of the universe and human society. Modern 
natural law asserts the inevitability of conflict in the 
desires and actions of humans and argues the necessity of 
imposing order by human contrivance. (Sigmund, 80.) David Hume 
is generally credited with making the most telling distinction 
between the two views. He stated that natural law principles 
are "not deriv'd from nature," but arise "artificially, tho' 
necessarily, from education, and human conventions." (David 
Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
19 46 , P- 483 .)
14 PP, 102, 104.
15 GS, 244- 245.
16 PP, 108- 109.
17 PP, 160.
18 PM, 296 .
19 PtP, •00
20 DM, 39.
21 PtP, 200 •
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24 GS, 377.
25 PM, 302.
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GS, 378-379.
GS, 379.
GS, 379-380.
GS, 166.
GS, 212.
PP, 153-154.
PP, 153-154.
PP, 142.
PP, 153-154.
PP, 153-154.
GS, 334.
GS, 333.
PP, 134. Given Lippmann's generally contentious attitude 
toward positivism —  he typically regarded it as seriously 
misguided but salvageable —  and given the positivists' 
misgivings about pragmatism, the notion of methodological 
common round existing under natural law seems wishful at best. 
Pushed on the matter, Lippmann would probably state that the 
necessary consensus would not be that difficult to secure.
GS, 346.
GS, 346.
GS, 346.
GS, 347.
PP, 123-124.
PP, 121.
PP, 121.
PP, 120.
PP, 122.
PP, 122.
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62 GS, 255.
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65 PP, 40.
66 PP, 162.
67 GS, 284.
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71 GS, 294-295.
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75 PM, 144.
76 PM, 171.
77 GS, 342-343.
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79 PP, 00 •
80 PM, 169.
81 GS, 342-343.
82 PP, 162.
83 PP, 00 •
84 PP, 77.
85 PP, 00 •
86 PM, 154.
87 Santayana, 1
88 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 1971, p. 426.
8 9 Rawls, p. 428.
' Sigmund, 209-210.
Section III
1 The formal-legal synthesis, which was standard fare well 
into the twentieth century (and may still be, depending upon 
the sympathies of one's informants), studies the law (hence, 
"legal") and formal government organization (hence, "formal"). 
It places extraordinary influence on constitutional and 
quasi-constitutional materials and is "less concerned with 
what people do in government than with the nature of the legal 
rules that govern their functioning." (Harry Eckstein, "On the 
'Science' of the State," Daedalus, Vol. 108, No. 4, Fall 1979, 
pp. 2-3.)
2 Eckstein, 9.
3 Michael Curtis, The Great Political Theories: Vol. 2. New 
York: Avon Books, 1981, p. 425.
4 Robert Ezra Park, American Journal of Sociology, quoted on 
back cover of Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion. New York: The 
Free Press, 1965.
5 Steel, 180.
6 Instead, several competing paradigms, each controversial in
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its own, vie among one another for the consensus necessary 
if any one of them is to gain dominance. Each competitor holds 
—  of course —  that it is a scientific approach. Paul 
Lazarsfeld, for example, claims that "public opinion reseach 
has become an empirical science." (Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "Public 
Opinion and the Classical Tradition," The Public Opinion 
Quarterly, Vol.. XXI, No. I, Spring 195 7, p. 40.)
7 In fact, The Public Philosophy called for the renewal of 
what Lippmann described in places as a divinely inspired 
natural law. A fraction of this natural law, he claimed, had 
been distilled in American constitutional materials. His 
position had seemingly come full circle (on a higher level) to 
an inspired version of the formal-legalism he had ridiculed 
forty years earlier.
8 John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent 
and End of Civil Government. 1690, Chapter IV, Section 22.
9 This general argument is developed by Sheldon S. Wolin, 
Politics and Vision. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960, 
pp. 346-347, 293-297. Wolin's interpretation, which is 
slightly different than the argument made here, does not 
mention Lippmann.
10 Wolin, 293.
11 Henry Kariel, "Shifting with Art," Polity, XII, No. 1, p. 9.
12 PO, 249.
13 PP, 176, 175.
14 william James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of 
Thinking. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1914, passim.
15 PO, 11.
16 PO, •0»—I
17 PO, 17.
18 PO, 19.
19 PO, 10.
20 PO, 10.
21 PO, 10.
22 PO, 7.
33 Santayana, 30.
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24 Santayana, 31.
25 PO, 16.
2 6 as Lippmann aged, his opinion of human nature grew more 
negative, as was discussed in Section II.
27 po, 120-121. Lippmann cites here the work of William 
McDougall, in Social Psychology, Introduction, Fourth Edition.
28 po, 230.
29 p o , 16.
30 PO, 121.
31 Lazarsfeld, 41.
32 Lippmann, The Phantom Public. New York: MacMillan, 1925, p.
20, quoted in Steel, p. 212.
33 PO, 19.
34 Contrary to Lippmann's assertion, politics brought to bear 
on the economy does not necessarily produce outmoded forms of
economic organization. In fact, the recent collapse of the 
U.S. steel industry demonstrated how the opposite can be true: 
U.S. business leaders, basing their decisions on shortterm, 
"economic" considerations, stalled he upgrading of steel 
manufacturing technology; meanwhile, political leaders in 
other countries helped push their steel industries ahead with 
extensive modernization programs.
35 PP, 25.
36 PP, 15.
37 PO, 19.
38 PP/ 14.
39 PP, 30.
40 McMurtry
41 PO, 158.
42 PO, 158.
43 PO, 158.
44 PO, 59.
45 PO, 59.
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47 PO, 63.
48 PO, 64.
49 PO, 65.
50 PO, 65.
51 PO, 65-66.
52 PO, 72-73 .
53 PO, 75.
54 PO, 65-66.
55 it would have been inconsistent for Lippmann to have 
described the stereotypes of the masses as naturally 
antagonistic to the dominant stereotype. To do so would imply 
a class-divided society, something which Lippmann maintained 
did not exist. However, the thrust of his argument in Public 
Opinion leads one to the conclusion that the opinions of the 
majority threaten the nation’s governability, and that there 
is some cohesion operating in these opinions —  a force 
similar, perhaps, to Gramsci's concept of hegemony.
56 Lippmann, "Blazing Publicity," Vanity Fair, September 1927, 
quoted in Steel, pp. 218-219.
Conclusion
1 Steel, 598-599.
